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  INTRODUCTION   
For more than a century, Delaware has dominated the cor-
porate charter competition. It currently supplies more than half 
of all public company charters. Delaware’s competitors have 
lagged so far behind that some scholars have declared the com-
petition to be over and Delaware the winner.1 
Delaware’s competitive strategy is principally judicial, not 
legislative.2 The Delaware Court of Chancery, which interprets 
and enforces the Delaware General Corporation Law, is the 
American court most specialized in corporate law. Delaware’s ju-
dicial strategy has been highly successful.3 Other states have 
tried to emulate it by establishing their own chancery courts, but 
financial constraints and state constitutions blocked them.4  
But even with more than half of all public companies in the 
United States incorporated in Delaware, the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s corporate caseload is small—perhaps only the equivalent 
of one-and-a-quarter full-time Chancellors.5 The United States 
 
 1. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (“The thesis of this Article is 
that the very notion that states compete for incorporations is a myth. Other 
than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorpora-
tions of public companies.”). 
 2. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589 (1990) (“My explanation [for Dela-
ware’s prominence] depends primarily on Delaware’s expert judges. Because of 
Delaware’s small size and its many corporate charters, Delaware judges see a 
high proportion of corporate cases, and develop corporate expertise.”). 
 3. E.g., Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder 
Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 808 (2015) (referring to the Delaware Court 
of Chancery as “a highly regarded judiciary with the proven ability to act swiftly 
based upon a developed body of case law”). 
 4. See, e.g., Implementation of Courts of Chancery: Hearing on Assemb. 
Con. Res. 35 Before Nev. Leg. Legis. Comm’n’s Subcomm. to Study the Benefits, 
Costs, & Feasibility of the Implementation of Courts of Chancery, 74th Interim 
Sess. (Nev. 2008), http://perma.cc/5DVQ-DRF4 (“Senator Care noted that the 
creation of a chancery court would require an amendment to the Nevada Con-
stitution and the operation of the current business court does not require an 
amendment.”); Black, supra note 2, at 590 (reporting that the New York City 
Bar Association believed they needed “a business court with knowledgeable 
judges” to compete with Delaware but that was “politically impractical because 
it required a state constitutional amendment”). 
 5. COMM’N ON CONN.’S LEADERSHIP IN CORP. & BUS. LAW, A REPORT TO 
THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY 6 (2015) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT RE-
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware’s corporate case-
load is four times that size.6 
Over the past sixteen years, the Delaware Chancery Court 
has struggled to attract cases and, as a result, some believe that 
Delaware’s strategy has begun to unravel.7 The unraveling re-
veals a potentially fatal contradiction. Delaware’s judicial strat-
egy requires that the state attract both incorporations and liti-
gation. But the interests of the plaintiffs’ attorneys who choose 
venue for shareholder litigation are directly opposed to the in-
terests of the managers who choose states of incorporation. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys want to maximize shareholder litigation 
and the associated attorneys’ fees, while the managers want to 
minimize them.8 Delaware has only recently recognized that it 
cannot appeal to both. 
This Article uses systems-strategic analysis to explore the 
role of Delaware’s judicial strategy in Delaware’s success and de-
termine the consequences of that strategy’s possible failure. A 
systems-strategic analysis begins by identifying a law-related 
system for study, then describes how the system functions, and 
finally infers what goals the system is pursuing from that func-
tion.9 Here, I analyze the system by which American corporate 
law is produced, adopted, and enforced—the corporate charter 
competition. Although charter competition extends to private 
 
PORT] (“[O]nly a quarter of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s work involves cor-
porate disputes. The majority of its cases involve trusts and estates, probate 
and guardianship matters.”). 
 6. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the 
“Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) has approximately the same market share of 
large, public-company bankruptcies—forty-nine percent—as Delaware has of 
public-company incorporations—forty-eight percent. UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. 
RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
13, 2018) (one-variable study of venue (by city) for the years 2011–2016). The 
Delaware Bankruptcy Court has six full-time judges. Judge’s Info, U.S. BANKR. 
COURT DIST. OF DEL., http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/judges-info-0 (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018). Delaware’s population would justify only one of the six. 
 7. Gregory DiCiancia, Note, Limiting Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits Via 
Fee-Shifting Bylaws: A Call for Delaware To Overturn and Revise Its Fee-Shift-
ing Bylaw Statute, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2015) (referring to “the growing 
doubt surrounding [Delaware’s] future as the nation’s corporate haven”). 
 8. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1364 
(2012) (“As a practical matter, the forum choice for representative litigation un-
der corporate law (either a derivative suit or a class action suit) will usually be 
made by the law firms acting on behalf of plaintiffs, with little or no client in-
put.”). 
 9. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 479, 497–509 (1997) (explaining how to conduct a systems analysis). 
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corporations and other types of entities, I have limited my anal-
ysis to the public-company context because the competition is 
most pronounced in that context and nearly all of the empirical 
studies necessary to conduct a systems analysis have been con-
fined to that context. I use corporate terminology, but the anal-
ysis is equally applicable to publicly traded limited partnerships 
and limited liability companies, and the statistics I have gener-
ated include them. 
Three principles structure the charter competition. First, a 
corporation can incorporate in any state. Second, regardless of 
the state chosen, the corporation will be allowed to do business 
in all states. Third, regardless of where the corporation does 
business, the law of the state of incorporation governs its inter-
nal affairs. Those affairs include substantially the entire scope 
of corporate law. 
The system—charter competition—is composed of three 
subsystems operating simultaneously. In the first, corporations 
choose states of incorporation. In the second, states decide what 
packages of regulation to offer. In the third, courts chosen in a 
variety of ways interpret and apply the incorporation state’s law 
to regulate the corporation. 
My analysis concludes that the system’s principal effects are 
to deregulate corporations and shield them from the democratic 
reimposition of regulation. The system accomplishes the former 
through a reiterative process in which corporations choose the 
states that regulate them least and the states reduce their regu-
lations to increase their appeal. A few states compete for incor-
porations to gain filing-fee and franchise-tax revenues from for-
eign corporations, but most compete as one element in a broad 
effort to attract business activity by demonstrating the state’s 
business friendliness. 
The system’s operation is obscured by its complexity, a jus-
tifying ideology of private ordering, and deliberate obfuscation. 
The structure of the charter competition insulates the law it pro-
duces from democratic control. The democratic process cannot 
reach the merits of corporate-law reform in Delaware, the other 
states, or at the federal level, and the structure preventing it is 
difficult to see. 
As a result, charter competition provides corporate manag-
ers with power and privilege at a level they could not possibly 
obtain under a democratic system. Directors can sit formally 
atop their organizations with little or no responsibility for what 
 2018] CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION 2105 
 
occurs within them.10 Delaware’s courts will not second guess 
managerial decisions.11 Directors alone decide when—if ever—
the corporation will share its wealth with shareholders.12 As a 
practical matter, shareholders or creditors cannot hold directors 
and officers personally liable for their negligence, their gross 
negligence,13 or their breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and good faith.14 Actions for breach of managers’ fiduciary duties 
to shareholders belong to the corporation, and managers have 
virtually complete discretion to determine whether to bring 
those actions.15 Managers fix their own compensation.16 If the 
corporation’s shares are widely held, other stakeholders can do 
nothing more than protest.17 Because managers have almost 
 
 10. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (failing to hold the directors of Citigroup liable for the decima-
tion of its business that occurred on their watch during the financial crisis). 
 11. Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration 
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 611 (2016) (refer-
ring to corporate law’s “expansive grant of powers to the directors”); Robert B. 
Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate 
Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 178 (2009) (“Delaware’s model of corporate 
governance, beyond the creation and naming functions described earlier, is to 
provide a predictable governance structure whose central tenet is to ‘trust di-
rectors.’”). 
 12. Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 659 (Del. Ch. 1975) 
(“Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refus-
ing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown.”). 
 13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018) (authorizing corporations to 
exculpate directors for liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care). 
 14. That is, the corporation can indemnify and insure managers against 
that liability. Id. Sections 145(a)–(b) require a finding that the directors or of-
ficers “acted in good faith and in a manner the [directors or officers] reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation” as a 
condition of indemnification. But the finding can be made by the corporation 
itself or by “independent legal counsel in a written opinion” and it may not be 
necessary at all if the indemnification is pursuant to section 145(f ) of the Dela-
ware code. Id. § 145(d). Even if liability for the bad-faith actions of directors or 
officers cannot be indemnified at all, the corporations can and usually do pro-
vide insurance against liability for them. Directors almost never pay anything 
for their breaches of fiduciary duty. See generally Bernard Black et al., Outside 
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (providing an empirical study 
of how often directors pay out-of-pocket). 
 15. That is, managers can prevent shareholders from bringing shareholder 
derivative actions by appointing independent directors to special litigation com-
mittees and, if there are no independent directors, the conflicted directors can 
appoint some. 
 16. E.g., tit. 8, § 141(h) (“Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors shall have the authority to fix 
the compensation of directors.”). 
 17. Federal law gives shareholders the right to a say on pay by voting to 
approve or disapprove directors’ and officers’ compensation, but the vote is 
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complete control over the proxy machinery18 and the right to re-
sist takeover attempts,19 managers can perpetuate themselves 
in office. If some group of shareholders seeks to take control of 
the corporation by consolidating shareholdings, the managers 
can retaliate with poison pills that selectively dilute the trouble-
makers’ holdings,20 strategic speed ups21 and delays22 of the vot-
ing process, asset sales, lock-ups, customer assurance pro-
grams,23 the issuance of new shares with unlimited voting 
rights,24 and a variety of other antitakeover devices.25 
Despite empirical evidence to the contrary, most scholars 
view the charter competition as a race to the top.26 The standard 
 
merely advisory. SEC, Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and 
Golden Parachute Compensation, 17 C.F.R §§ 229, 240, 249 (2017) (SEC Rule 
14a-21a). 
 18. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Share-
holder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 475, 481 (2008) (referring to “the standard state law rules that produce 
reimbursement only if the insurgent wins control of the board” and citing those 
rules as “providing evidence that jurisdictional competition for incorporations 
is geared toward appealing to managerial interests”). 
 19. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at 
*24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), aff ’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010) (“[T]he board of direc-
tors is the defender of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the pro-
tector of the corporation’s shareholders.” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995))). 
 20. E.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (validat-
ing poison pills). 
 21. E.g., Ala. By-Prod. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 (Del. 1991) (limiting 
Schnell v. Chris–Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), which had in-
validated a speed up, to “those instances that threaten the fabric of the law, or 
which by an improper manipulation of the law, would deprive a person of a clear 
right”). 
 22. E.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Del. 
1998) (noting that “the combined effect of the two defensive measures would be 
to delay any acquisition of Quickturn by Mentor for at least nine months”). 
 23. E.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging Problem of Embedded De-
fenses: Lessons from Air Line Pilots Ass’n, International v. UAL Corp., 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1244 (2007) (“PeopleSoft initiated a ‘Customer Assur-
ance Program’ (CAP), under which PeopleSoft customers would receive back be-
tween two and five times their money if any company acquired PeopleSoft and 
then reduced the support for PeopleSoft’s software products during the first four 
years of the customer ’s contract.”). 
 24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (2018) (authorizing “designation” of the 
“powers” and “rights” of shares by resolution when they have not been “set forth 
in the certificate of incorporation”). 
 25. ALAN R. PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPO-
RARY APPROACH 840–45 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing classified boards, poison pills, 
share repurchases, and lock-ups). 
 26. E.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 770 (1995) (“[T]here is a broad consensus that 
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account is that Delaware won the race by developing corporate 
law expertise and striking the most efficient balance between the 
rights of managers and shareholders.27 Delaware alone provided 
a specialized court that could respond quickly and expertly to 
corporate needs and Delaware alone was able to credibly commit 
to continue serving the interests of corporations.28 Delaware’s 
lead is so great and the network effects so strong that no other 
state actively competes against it.29 If some other state adopted 
a rule or practice that provided it with an advantage in the com-
petition, Delaware could and would nullify the advantage by cop-
ying the rule or practice.30 
The systems-strategic analysis I employ suggests that the 
standard account should be revised in essentially five respects: 
First, the charter competition is neither dormant nor merely 
a competition between Delaware and the corporations’ home 
states. Other states not only compete, but have attracted twenty-
five percent of all public companies that have incorporated out-
side their home states. 
Second, charter competition should be modeled not as an at-
tempt to strike the right balance between managers and share-
holders, but as a delegation of power to managers who then 
strike that balance through implicit contracting. That reconcep-
tualization leads to the insight that states do not need corporate-
law expertise to compete for incorporations. 
 
state competition to produce corporate law is a race to (or at least toward) the 
top.”). 
 27. E.g., CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSAL 11 (2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL EXPLANATION], http://www 
.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL 
-EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf. 
 28. Delaware committed by giving the state to the corporations as a hos-
tage. That is, Delaware increased its filing-fee and franchise-tax revenues to the 
extent that the state is dependent on them. E.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 235 
(1985) (“[A] state budget largely dependent on franchise revenue is an asset that 
precommits the state to not welching on its corporate customers by radically 
revising its corporate law policy to the detriment of their interests . . . .”). But 
see Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“If the cost of re-incorporating is low, the gains 
from midstream opportunism are low as well, and the hostage is superfluous.”). 
 29. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 748 (“The notion that states compete, 
and that this competition results in a metaphorical race, is a myth.”). 
 30. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Lei-
surely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE 
L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (asserting that “Delaware could ‘match’ by adopting the 
challenger ’s improved rules”). 
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Third, corporate charter competition as a system is neither 
a race to the top or the bottom. It is capable of generating only 
one result: deregulation. What remains of corporate law is not 
regulation, but mere obfuscation. 
Fourth, Delaware employs a principally judicial strategy in 
the competition. That strategy, which requires Delaware to at-
tract litigation as well as incorporations, is faltering. The shift 
to arbitration of shareholder litigation that is already in progress 
may strip Delaware of its competitive advantage and end its 
dominance. 
Fifth, regardless of what happens to Delaware, for the fore-
seeable future charter competition will remain a highly stable 
system that is effectively beyond democratic control. The only 
solution to the problem of charter competition remains unthink-
able: abandon the internal affairs doctrine. 
This Article proceeds to those conclusions as follows. Part I 
first describes and analyzes the charter-competition system. The 
internal affairs doctrine provides the system’s foundation. The 
system consists of three subsystems in which (1) corporations 
choose incorporation states; (2) states decide what corporate law 
packages to offer; and (3) courts do the actual regulating. The 
analysis concludes that Delaware’s success is largely attributa-
ble to and dependent on its unique court system. Part II then 
explores Delaware’s judicial strategy in more depth, argues that 
Delaware has had difficulty attracting the litigation on which 
the strategy depends, and describes the potentially fatal threat 
from arbitration bylaws. It concludes that Delaware may be un-
able to prevent the loss of its shareholder litigation and the con-
sequent failure of its judicial strategy. 
Part III seeks to project the effect of a failure of Delaware’s 
judicial strategy on the corporate charter competition. It con-
cludes that the competition could melt down to an equilibrium 
in which no state even purports to impose any corporate regula-
tion and no state derives significant fees or taxes from the incor-
porations it attracts. It then concludes that although Delaware’s 
position in the corporate charter competition is precarious, the 
charter competition itself rests on a stable foundation. Regard-
less of what happens to Delaware, charter competition will pre-
vent the imposition of corporate regulation for the foreseeable 
future.  
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I.  THE SYSTEM FOR CORPORATE REGULATION   
Charter competition is the system by which U.S. jurisdic-
tions regulate corporations. The internal affairs doctrine, which 
provides that the law of the incorporation state governs the cor-
poration’s internal affairs, is the system’s foundation. That doc-
trine allows corporations to choose their regulators by choosing 
their states of incorporation. 
In this Article, I use the term corporate regulation to refer 
to legal requirements that fall within the scope of the internal 
affairs doctrine.31 Requirements fall within that scope if they ap-
ply to corporations, but do not also apply to individuals.32 They 
include the traditional contents of corporation statutes, while ex-
cluding antitrust, fair trade, criminal, and other laws that apply 
to a person regardless of whether the person is a corporation.33 
Generally speaking, corporations prefer to be regulated by 
the states that will regulate them least. Because states prefer to 
be chosen, they modify their corporation laws to reduce the laws’ 
levels of regulation. Over more than a century, the pressure from 
these choices by the corporations and the states has systemati-
cally eliminated all meaningful regulation from American corpo-
rate law.34 
As shown in Figure 1, the system in which the states com-
pete consists of three subsystems. In the first, corporations 
choose states of incorporation. In the second, the states enact 
and revise their corporation laws, in the process sometimes cre-
ating courts, conferring jurisdiction, and specifying who may se-
lect venue and in what circumstances. In the third, the empow-
ered courts regulate corporations in accord with the laws of their 
states of incorporation. 
 
 
 31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 
1971) (defining internal affairs doctrine). 
 32. Id. § 302 cmt. a (making the distinction between rules that apply only 
to corporations and rules that also apply to individuals). 
 33. Id. § 301 (“The rights and liabilities of a corporation with respect to a 
third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can likewise be done 
by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are ap-
plicable to non-corporate parties.”). 
 34. E.g., Black, supra note 2, at 544 (“After a century of erosion through 
competition for corporate charters, what is left of state corporate law is an 
empty shell that has form but no content.”); Bayless Manning, The Share-
holder ’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 
245 n.37 (1962) (referring to “our great empty corporate statutes—towering sky-
scrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing 
but wind”). 
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Figure 1: Corporate Charter Competition 
 
This Part first describes the role of the internal affairs doc-
trine, then describes the function of each of the three subsystems 
separately, and ends by demonstrating the insulation of the sys-
tem from democratic processes. 
A. THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflicts of law rule unique 
to corporate law. The rule is that the law of the state of incorpo-
ration governs the corporation’s internal affairs.35 It defines in-
ternal affairs so broadly that the doctrine extends to virtually all 
of corporate law. The rule’s immediate effect is to empower 
states of incorporation to make rules that apply extraterritori-
ally. Its ultimate effect is to deregulate corporate law.  
1. Externality-Generating Capacity 
The internal affairs doctrine is usually described as apply-
ing only to the relationship among “the corporation and its offic-
ers, directors, and shareholders”36 and is often justified as part 
 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 
1971). 
 36. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs 
doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State 
should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters 
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current 
officers, directors, and shareholders.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on 
Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 
161 (1985) (describing the internal affairs doctrine as “the notion that only one 
state, almost always the site of incorporation, should be authorized to regulate 
the relationships among a corporation and its officers, directors, and sharehold-
ers”). 
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of an implied contract among those parties.37 In practice, how-
ever, courts often apply the doctrine to the corporation’s relation-
ship with both contract38 and tort39 creditors. With the coopera-
tion of the Delaware courts, managers have expanded the 
doctrine strategically to also cover persons interested in buying 
the corporation. The managers’ main strategy is to subject ac-
quiring shareholders to rules that burden them without simi-
larly burdening nonacquiring shareholders. The poison pill is a 
prominent example. 
The internal affairs doctrine’s impact is broader than its 
scope. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote, “[n]o corporate affairs 
are ever exclusively ‘internal;’ they will always have conse-
quences of greater or lesser magnitude on the ‘outside’ world.”40 
Professor Kent Greenfield provides these examples of internal 
rules with external impacts: “a rule that directors should max-
imize profit to shareholders, or a rule that directors should not 
disclose information to communities about their business prac-
tices absent a legal or financial imperative, or a rule that share-
holders need not pay the debts of the corporation.”41 
Because rules that apply only internally have direct effects 
on third parties, incorporation states can enact corporate-law 
rules that have direct effects on third parties and apply to them 
 
 37. Elizabeth Cosenza, The Persistent Problem of Multi-Forum Shareholder 
Litigation: A Proposed Statutory Response To Reshuffle the Deck, 10 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 413, 423 (2016) (“The rationale for the internal affairs doctrine is . . . 
that upon acquiring stock, shareholders ‘impliedly agree’ that the internal af-
fairs of the company should be governed by the laws of the state of incorpora-
tion.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt To Lift the Veil of 
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. 
REV. 853, 903 (1997) (“If shareholders do not like the laws of the state of incor-
poration, they do not have to invest in this corporation.”). 
 38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1971) (“Matters which may also affect the interests of the corpora-
tion’s creditors include the issuance of bonds, the declaration and payment of 
dividends, loans by the corporation to directors, officers and shareholders, and 
the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its 
own stock.”). 
 39. E.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: 
Why Courts Should Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General 
Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008) (“The ma-
jority of courts apply the internal affairs doctrine to impose the law of the state 
of incorporation upon piercing claims, whether those claims are based on tort 
judgments or upon contract obligations.”). 
 40. Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause: 
The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 376–77 (1988). 
 41. Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corpo-
rate Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 135, 136–37 (2004). 
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extraterritorially. For that reason, the internal affairs doctrine 
is often and correctly characterized as an “externality ma-
chine.”42 
2. Losing-State Generation 
The effect of the internal affairs doctrine is that each state 
can regulate extraterritorially with regard to its own corpora-
tions but must yield to other states’ extraterritorial regulation of 
their corporations. With respect to public-company incorpora-
tions, at least, the trade is an uneven one. Compustat43 data on 
7061 public-company incorporations show that, as compared 
with a hypothetical regulatory scheme that would require com-
panies to incorporate in their headquarters states, Delaware 
gains 3879 corporations (fifty-five percent of the 7061).44 Only 
four other states gain at all. Nevada gains 282 corporations (four 
percent), Maryland 262 corporations (four percent), Massachu-
setts six corporations (0.01%), and Wyoming five corporations 
(0.01%).45 Minnesota breaks even, and the remaining forty-four 
states lose corporations.46 California, home to 1210 companies 
but state of incorporation for only 112, is the biggest loser.47 One 
might expect that such high concentrations of winners and losers 
would cause the consensus in favor of the internal affairs doc-
trine to break down. 
  
 
 42. Id. at 140 (“The internal affairs doctrine is easily characterized as an 
externality machine.”); accord Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate Gov-
ernance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
551, 565 (2018) (“Joel Bakan has famously described corporations as ‘external-
izing machines.’”). 
 43. Michael Bradley Michael, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1043, 1094 n.58 (1992) (“COMPUSTAT is the most frequently used and 
comprehensive data base of annual accounting numbers for large corpora-
tions.”). 
 44. Lynn M. LoPucki, Compustat: Table 1 Statistics (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file 
with author). 
 45. Lynn M. LoPucki, Compustat: Incorporation Count 3 (Oct. 15, 2016) (on 
file with author). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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Table 1: The Biggest Winners from Corporate Charter 
Competition 
Jurisdiction Head-quarters Shop Out Shop In Gain or Loss 
Incorpora-
tions 
Delaware 85 39 3918 3879 3964 
Nevada 74 29 311 282 356 
Maryland 258 144 406 262 520 
Massachusetts 499 279 285 6 505 
Wyoming 1 1 6 5 6 
With respect to the states shown, the table accounts for all companies with 
headquarters and jurisdiction of incorporation in the United States that were 
returned on a search for companies active in 2015 in the Compustat North 
America database. The total number of companies is 7061. 
 
“Shop Out” is a firm headquartered in the jurisdiction that is incorporated else-
where. 
“Shop In” is a firm headquartered outside the jurisdiction that is incorporated 
in the jurisdiction. 
 
3. Losing-State Acquiescence 
Legally, the losing states could end the charter competition 
simply by rejecting the internal affairs doctrine. Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court has held that the internal affairs doc-
trine is “mandated by ‘constitutional principles, except in the 
rarest situations,’”48 commentators overwhelmingly disagree.49 
Alternatively, the states could end the competition by imposing 
conditions on foreign corporations’ access to their domestic mar-
kets.50 They have instead chosen to allow the competition to con-
tinue.51 
 
 48. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del 1987). 
 49. E.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards 
a Stakeholder Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1067, 1082 (2008) (“Contrary to the claims of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the internal affairs doctrine does not have a constitutional dimension.”); 
Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 357 (referring to the inference that “a state cannot 
regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation (at least with respect to 
shareholder voting rights) without violating the Commerce Clause” as “untena-
ble”). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (AM. LAW INST. 
1971) provides that “[s]ubject to constitutional limitations,” a state may prohibit 
a foreign corporation from doing business, or conducting other activities, within 
its territory or may impose conditions as the price of permitting the corporation 
to do such business or such other acts. 
 51. E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP ACT § 15.05(c) (2007) (“This Act does not au-
thorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation authorized to transact business in this state.”). 
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A powerful combination of factors explains the losing states’ 
acquiescence to the internal affairs doctrine. First, all fifty states 
have adopted the doctrine with respect to public companies.52 A 
state’s switch to any other rule would initially create conflicts 
among the states and the possibility that “a corporation could be 
faced with conflicting demands.”53 Second, states may fear that 
if the internal affairs doctrine becomes unsettled, the federal 
government might issue charters, taking both the power to reg-
ulate corporations and the resulting filing-fee and franchise-tax 
revenues for itself.54 That change would take revenues from even 
the losing states, because every state currently derives revenues 
not only from incorporations, but also from foreign corporations 
doing business in the state. Third, states joining in an effort to 
reform corporate law may “fear retaliatory responses from 
[other] states, particularly Delaware.”55 
Fourth, the losing states do not lose those revenues Dela-
ware gains from winning. Losing states that would have taxed a 
corporation’s incorporation in the state instead tax the corpora-
tion’s doing business in the state. Corporations pay more and the 
losing states collect almost the same amount of money they 
would if they had retained their corporations. Losing does de-
prive states of their ability to regulate the corporations operating 
within their borders, but unilateral rejection of the internal af-
fairs doctrine would be a dangerous way to attempt to solve that 
problem. Corporations might respond to the first states to reject 
the doctrine by moving their operations out of the state. Rejec-
tion of the internal affairs doctrine would, in any event, certainly 
 
 52. California and New York have partially rejected the internal affairs 
doctrine, but not with respect to public companies. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c) 
(2010) (“This section does not apply to any corporation . . . with outstanding se-
curities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the NYSE Amex, the NASDAQ 
Global Market, or the NASDAQ Capital Market . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 1317 (McKinney 2003) (laying out the liability of foreign directors under New 
York corporate law); id. § 1320(a)(1) (“[A] foreign corporation . . . shall be exempt 
from the provisions of . . . subparagraph (a)(1) of section 1317 . . . if . . . [s]hares 
of such corporation were listed on a national securities exchange . . . .”). 
 53. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
 54. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 636 (2003) 
(“[States] know that a crisis will attract federal attention and that their corpo-
rate law authority might be sapped if it does.”); Lipton, supra note 11, at 641 
(concluding that “the displacement of state control [of corporate litigation by 
arbitration] might pave the way for more intrusive, and substantive, federal 
regulation”). 
 55. Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Ten-
tative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1499 
(2002). 
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complicate a state’s efforts to portray itself as business-friendly. 
Lastly, the beneficiaries of the internal affairs doctrine are the 
corporations physically located in the losing states. Rejection of 
the doctrine would deprive them of the freedom to choose their 
regulators. They might retaliate politically against the elected 
officials responsible for their loss of that freedom.  
Together, these factors render the internal affairs doctrine 
virtually immutable. The losing states are not so much victims 
of the internal affairs doctrine as coconspirators keeping it in 
place. The doctrine enables states to import what amounts to a 
regulatory void in corporate law,56 without having to accept po-
litical responsibility for doing so. As a result, the internal affairs 
doctrine remains firmly entrenched and provides a stable plat-
form for the expansion of unregulated corporate power. 
B. CORPORATE CHOICE OF INCORPORATION STATE 
Even charter-competition skeptics agree that public compa-
nies shop for their states of incorporation.57 Choosing a state 
makes that state the corporation’s exclusive corporate regulator. 
Every corporation chooses a state of incorporation at its incep-
tion and can change its state of incorporation at any time by any 
of several simple and inexpensive methods of reincorporation. 
Both public and private corporations shop for incorporation 
states. To illustrate, tiny Delaware is the incorporation state for 
1.2 million private entities—nearly as many as the approxi-
mately 1.5 million incorporated in California.58 This Article fo-
cuses, however, on the motives and choices of public companies. 
Seventy-four percent of public companies are incorporated 
in a state other than the state in which they are headquar-
tered.59 If the advantages were sufficiently great, some portion 
of the remaining twenty-six percent would undoubtedly also be 
willing to incorporate elsewhere. 
 
 56. See sources cited supra note 34. 
 57. E.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 735 (“[F]irm choice, rather than 
state competition, is therefore the proper paradigm to analyze corporate law.”). 
 58. About Agency, STATE OF DEL.: DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware 
.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“More than [one million] 
business entities have made Delaware their legal home.”); Public Records Act 
request from Lynn M. LoPucki to California Secretary of State, Aug. 2, 2013 (on 
file with the author). 
 59. Infra Table 2. 
 2116 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2101 
 
1. Who Decides? 
Managers, not shareholders, choose the incorporation 
state.60 In an initial public offering, corporate insiders make the 
choice before they approach the underwriters.61 The underwrit-
ers present the managers’ choice to the prospective shareholders 
as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. In the context of the overall 
investment opportunity, state of incorporation is not a salient 
term and will be overlooked.62 Because all states offer essentially 
the same corporate law,63 the choice among the states matters 
to a rational investor in only the rarest of circumstances. Thus 
scholars who model choice of incorporation state as a bargain be-
tween managers and shareholders are modeling a theoretical 
choice, not a choice in which shareholders are actually partici-
pating. 
Managers also decide whether the corporation should later 
change its state of incorporation.64 Corporations generally seek 
reincorporation after periods of abnormal positive returns to 
 
 60. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 592 (“Under prevailing law, 
management has veto power over reincorporations.”); Renee M. Jones, Does 
Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 896 (2006) (“[M]anagers choose the state of incor-
poration.”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977) (“[T]he decision as 
to which state to incorporate in is in almost all cases a managerial decision.”). 
 61. Underwriter influence is apparently minimal. William J. Carney et al., 
Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law, 2 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 123, 134 n.48 (2012) (“[W]e found that the jurisdiction had already 
been chosen for the IPO by the time the matter reached the underwriter (81% 
of the time).”). 
 62. Allen, supra note 3, at 793 (“Companies that are going public often in-
clude provisions, such as classified boards and dual class common stock, which 
are not “stockholder friendly,” in their organizational documents. Eager inves-
tors often overlook such provisions.”). 
 63. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[V]ariations 
in state corporation laws are minimal.”); Romano, supra note 28, at 278 (finding 
in a survey of corporations that “the top 200 non-Delaware firms did not per-
ceive the corporation laws of their state of incorporation to differ much from 
Delaware’s code”); Winter, supra note 60, at 255 (“[T]he Delaware Code is no 
longer significantly different from those of a number of other states.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1435, 1460 (1992) (“[M]anagers . . . have considerable influence over rein-
corporation decisions.”); id. at 1475 (“[N]otwithstanding the requirement of 
shareholder approval, Delaware and other states have significant room (and in-
centives) to adopt value-decreasing rules for the governance of certain corporate 
law issues.”). 
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shareholders.65 In theory, shareholders could refuse to approve 
the managers’ choice, but such refusals are rare.66 While some 
older studies suggested a generally positive market reaction to 
reincorporation to Delaware,67 a more recent study using a bet-
ter methodology shows a negative, but statistically insignificant, 
market reaction to reincorporation in Delaware.68 Shareholders’ 
indifference to reincorporation in Delaware leaves managers 
free to do it. 
2. What Is the Basis for Choice? 
A substantial literature reports the bases on which corpora-
tions choose their states of incorporation. These include the cost 
of incorporation in the state; particular features of the state’s 
substantive law; the quality of the state’s courts; the preferences 
of the corporation’s professional advisors; the perceived political 
responsiveness of the state; the state’s reputation; and the famil-
iarity of the managers and investors with the state’s corporate-
law package.  
a. Direct Costs 
Although Delaware is by far the most expensive state in 
which a large public company can incorporate, the direct costs of 
incorporation are sufficiently small that they are unlikely to af-
fect many companies’ decisions.69 To be incorporated in a state, 
a corporation pays an initial incorporation fee, an annual re-
newal fee, and, in some states, an annual franchise tax. In most 
states, the annual fees and taxes for even a large public company 
 
 65. Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: 
“Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 281 (1980) 
(finding that “over the [two] years preceding the month of the switch, stockhold-
ers earn positive abnormal returns”). 
 66. But see Dave Ebersole, Reforming Ohio Corporate Law and Securities 
Regulation To Facilitate Investment in Ohio, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 
451, 451–56 (2012) (describing shareholder rejection of Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co.’s attempt to reincorporate from Delaware to Ohio). 
 67. Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. 
L. REV. 1049, 1058–59 (2016). 
 68. Id. at 1052 (“We show that Delaware law does not add to or subtract 
significant value from publicly traded companies.”). 
 69. Bebchuk and Cohen argue that “the extra costs of going out of state” 
are “likely to be trivial for firms that are very large.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where To Incorporate, 46 J. LAW & ECON. 383, 
398 (2003). 
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are only a few hundred dollars.70 In Delaware, they reach 
$250,000 annually for the largest companies.71  
To do business in each state other than its state of incorpo-
ration, a corporation also pays qualification fees, renewal fees, 
and, in some states, an annual franchise tax. With only a few 
exceptions, the fees for doing business in a state approximately 
equal the fees for incorporating and renewing in the state.72 The 
result is that incorporation in a state where the corporation does 
not do business adds the cost of the incorporation state to the 
corporation’s total costs, but incorporation in a state where the 
corporation does do business probably does not increase the cor-
poration’s total costs at all.  
To change its incorporation state after the initial selection, 
the corporation must also pay legal fees, additional state filing 
fees, and perhaps the costs of printing and distributing proxy 
statements.73 In 1985, Romano estimated the typical reincorpo-
ration cost for a public company at $40,00074 and noted the high-
est reincorporation cost estimate in her survey was $1.1 mil-
lion.75 Black estimated typical reincorporation costs at $40,000 
to $80,000 in 1990.76 These costs of reincorporation do not ap-
pear to be high enough to affect corporate decision making. 
b. Substantive Law 
The crux of the charter competition debate has been 
whether managers choose incorporation states to benefit them-
selves (race to the bottom) or to benefit both themselves and 
shareholders in some efficient combination (race to the top). But 
the literature identifies only a single difference in corporate law 
that clearly causes corporations to choose one state over another. 
 
 70. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 690 tbl.1, 692 tbl.2 (showing amounts 
by state). 
 71. Annual Report and Tax Information, STATE OF DEL.: DIV. OF CORPS., 
https://corp.delaware.gov/frtax.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 72. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., CALIFORNIA’S CORPORATION TAXES: FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2003), https://ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1083.pdf 
(explaining corporations doing business in California pay the minimum fran-
chise tax). 
 73. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 28, at 246 (discussing reincorporation 
costs). 
 74. Id. Adjusted for inflation, that is about $88,110 in 2015 dollars. 
 75. Id. at 249. 
 76. Black, supra note 2, at 558 (estimating the cost of public company rein-
corporation at $40,000 to $80,000). 
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That difference is between laws that protect managers 
against takeovers and laws that do not. Professor Guhan Subra-
manian showed that “managers migrate to (and fail to migrate 
away from)”77 three types of antitakeover statutes: (1) control 
share acquisition statutes; (2) business combination statutes; 
and (3) pill validation statutes. Subramanian characterized his 
finding as “generally consistent with the explicit prediction of 
race-to-the-bottom theorists and inconsistent with the explicit 
prediction of race-to-the-top theorists.”78 Similarly, Professors 
Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen found that corporations are 
more likely to choose Delaware when their home states provide 
managers with fewer protections against takeovers.79 
In a separate article, Bebchuk reasoned that a race to the 
bottom would occur with respect to rules related to managers’ 
ability to “significantly redistribute” wealth from the corporation 
to themselves.80 He identified the rules governing managerial 
self-dealing, the taking of corporate opportunities, and insider 
trading81 as likely to produce races to the bottom. He also pre-
dicted a race to the bottom in rules governing “the regulation of 
takeovers and proxy contests, the protection of creditors, disclo-
sure regulation, and the protection of constituencies other than 
providers of capital” because those rules could create significant 
externalities.82 With respect to insignificantly redistributive 
rules, Bebchuk reasoned that the race would be to the top,83 but 
he did not identify specific rules. 
Contrary to Subramanian, Bebchuk, and Cohen, Professor 
Robert Daines found that “[p]oison pill or control share statutes 
make it more likely that firms will leave a state and incorporate 
in Delaware,” but he cautioned that “this effect is not robust and 
is theoretically questionable given the ease with which firms can 
 
 77. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incor-
poration Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1838 (2002). 
 78. Id. at 1848. 
 79. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 387 (“[S]tates with no anti[-]take-
over statutes, such as California, do poorly and retain a relatively small fraction 
of the companies located in them. . . . [S]tates that amass most or all standard 
antitakeover statutes are the most successful both in retaining in-state firms 
and in attracting out-of-state firms.”). 
 80. Bebchuk, supra note 64, at 1460. 
 81. Id. at 1462. 
 82. Id. at 1494. 
 83. Id. at 1462 (“[M]arket discipline will probably discourage managers 
from seeking inefficient rules with respect to insignificantly redistributive is-
sues.”). 
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opt into or out of these provisions.”84 He should also have noted 
that Delaware has case law validating poison pills, so it is far 
from clear how a poison-pill statute in the home state could be 
driving reincorporations to Delaware.85  
c. Courts 
Numerous sources stress the importance of the Delaware 
court system to corporations’ decisions to incorporate in Dela-
ware.86 At least twenty-two states have created business courts 
of some nature,87 and some have done so in the hope of compet-
ing with Delaware for incorporations.88 But Delaware retains 
several clear advantages.  
In Delaware, the five-judge Court of Chancery has jurisdic-
tion over corporate matters, and appeals are directly to the five-
justice Supreme Court. The Delaware system is unique in at 
least three important respects. First, Delaware’s Chancery 
 
 84. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1559, 1597 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 85. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on 
the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 
1089 (2012) (noting that since 1985 “Delaware judges have struck down some 
new variations of the poison pill as entrenchment mechanisms, but generally, 
they have approved traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices for 
well-intentioned boards of directors”). 
 86. E.g., LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 5 
(2007), https://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (“Many experienced 
lawyers believe that the principal reason to recommend to their clients that they 
incorporate in Delaware is the Delaware courts and the body of case law those 
courts have developed.”); Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“My explanation [for Del-
aware’s prominence] depends primarily on Delaware’s expert judges.”); John F. 
Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1915, 1983 (2012) (“[Business] courts can attract—and have attracted—
litigation business to the jurisdiction that creates them . . . .”); Romano, supra 
note 28, at 277 (“[T]he product Delaware offers is not simply particular statutes, 
but also their interpretation by courts.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s 
Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 221 (2015) (“Delaware’s key contribution to 
U.S. corporate governance is the production of substantially judge-made corpo-
rate law . . . .”). 
 87. Lee Applebaum, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN 
STATE COURTS: THE STEADY GROWTH OF BUSINESS COURTS 70 (2011), http:// 
www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/ 
Applebaum.ashx (“These ‘business courts’ assign specialist judges to manage 
and decide commercial and business cases and have increased from three pilot 
dockets in 1993 to over 40 court programs within 22 states in 2010.”); see Coyle, 
supra note 86, at 1918 (“Over the past twenty years, specialized trial courts with 
dockets comprised primarily or exclusively of business cases—commonly known 
as business courts—have been established in nineteen states in the United 
States.”). 
 88. See supra note 4; see also Coyle, supra note 86. 
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Court is probably the only specialized business court authorized 
to operate without juries.89 Second, the court has a long tradition 
of publishing its opinions in West Reporters and on Westlaw and 
Lexis, which has created a large body of precedent.90 By contrast, 
the business courts of most competing states have only recently 
begun publishing their opinions on websites and some do not 
publish them at all.91 Third, although the Delaware Chancery 
Court has a substantial noncorporate caseload, that court’s cor-
porate law caseload has been sufficiently large and concentrated 
that Delaware’s judges have been able to develop considerable 
corporate-law expertise. 
d. Legal Advice 
The knowledge and beliefs of legal advisors play an im-
portant role in corporations’ choice of incorporation state. In a 
study of initial public offerings, Daines found that whether the 
corporation’s law firm had “clients in many states” was more im-
portant in choosing between the company’s home state and Del-
aware than any other variable he tested.92 National law firms 
tended to recommend Delaware incorporation, while law firms 
with clients in only one state tended to recommend home-state 
incorporation.93 In a survey of lawyers and underwriters, Carney 
et al. found that underwriters’ and issuers’ lawyers overwhelm-
ingly recommended “incorporation of public corporations in Del-
aware regardless of the corporation’s location.”94 The lawyers’ 
familiarity with Delaware law was an important factor. Seventy-
five percent of underwriters’ lawyers and fifty-five percent of is-
suers’ lawyers agreed with the statement “I don’t recommend in-
corporation in states other than Delaware or my state because I 
 
 89. Supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Kahan & Kamar, supra 
note 1, at 711 (showing eight business courts that offer trial by jury). 
 90. Daines, supra note 84, at 1583 (“Other states, lacking Delaware’s es-
tablished precedent, unique case flow, and specialized courts, are likely less able 
to develop a distinctive and predictable body of case law.”). 
 91. Coyle, supra note 86, at 1957–58 (providing a table showing that twelve 
of seventeen business courts publish opinions on the courts’ websites). 
 92. Daines, supra note 84, at 1595. 
 93. Id. (“[L]ocal lawyers advise firms to incorporate locally, while national 
lawyers advise firms to incorporate in Delaware.”). Daines does not indicate how 
he determined which firms had “clients in many states.” 
 94. Carney et al., supra note 61, at 140 (reporting that for underwriters’ 
lawyers, the proportion was ninety-seven percent; for issuers’ lawyers the pro-
portion was eighty-three percent). 
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am relatively unfamiliar with the details of the laws and courts 
of these other states.”95 
e. Political Responsiveness 
Some scholars assert that corporations favor their home 
state because the corporations can more easily influence their 
home state’s legislature in seeking changes to corporate law.96 
For example, Bebchuk and Cohen state: 
[A] firm located in a state—especially a large firm located in a small 
state—might hope that its stature and clout in the state would lead 
judges or public officials to give it favorable treatment with respect to 
some corporate law issues that might arise. Similarly, a firm located in 
a state might expect that, if it displays “loyal citizenship” by incorpo-
rating in the state, it would increase its chances of getting favorable 
treatment from public officials on issues unrelated to corporate law 
that might arise in the firm’s dealings with the state.97 
Bebchuk and Cohen also found that “states that have a heavily 
Democratic electorate, and thus are more likely to have activist 
judges, are less successful in attracting firms.”98 
f. Other Attractors 
Several scholars have recently proposed that corporations 
choose Delaware for other features that have no specific locus in 
Delaware’s laws, courts, or administrative procedures. Omari 
Scott Simmons proposes that attraction to Delaware is largely 
explained by Delaware’s brand, which includes “reputation, vis-
ibility to top management, time-in-business, customer lists, com-
petitors, academic curriculum, and discursive debate.”99 Michael 
Klausner proposes that charters have network effects that en-
hance their value when large numbers of corporations adopt 
them.100 William J. Carney et al. found in a survey of underwrit-
ers’ and issuers’ attorneys that corporations chose Delaware “be-
 
 95. Id. at 143. 
 96. Daines, supra note 84, at 1578 (“The most plausible benefit from local 
incorporation is that it allows managers to influence the firm’s corporate law 
rules by lobbying the legislature for particular corporate law reforms.”). 
 97. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 398–99. 
 98. Id. at 421. 
 99. Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Domi-
nance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139 (2008). 
 100. Klausner, supra note 26 (discussing the effects of corporate contracts 
and associated network externalities). 
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cause they believe that investors who might purchase the com-
pany’s securities are familiar only with Delaware law.”101 Fi-
nally, Brian Broughman et al. provide evidence that because 
most attorneys are fluent in home-state law and Delaware law, 
“a firm raising financing from in-state and out-of-state investors 
will choose Delaware to provide in-state and out-of-state inves-
tors a legal language that all can speak.”102 Because each of 
these factors can operate independently of Delaware’s law, 
courts, or administrators, none depends on assumptions about 
Delaware’s superiority. 
In summary, corporations choose states through a diffuse 
process in which reputation and familiarity dominate, providing 
Delaware with a strong advantage. Delaware’s only tangible ad-
vantage is its judicial system. Protection of managers against 
takeover is the only substantive law issue that clearly matters. 
Both takeover protection and the direct costs of incorporation 
weigh against Delaware to the extent they matter at all. 
C. STATE CHOICE OF CORPORATE LAW PACKAGE 
In the second subsystem of the system for corporate regula-
tion, states decide what corporate-law packages to offer. Because 
managers choose the incorporation state, states tend to compete 
to offer the packages most attractive to managers.103 The pack-
ages consist of four elements: (1) a corporation statute; (2) a 
method for legislative amendment; (3) a court system that in-
cludes judges, attorneys, and precedent; and (4) a state agency 
that maintains corporate records.104 The state determines what 
 
 101. Carney et al., supra note 61, at 137 (“92% of underwriters’ lawyers and 
83% of issuers’ lawyers agreed that ‘Delaware is a better place than my state to 
incorporate for public companies because investors are more familiar with Del-
aware law.’”). 
 102. Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and 
Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 893 (2014). 
 103. E.g., COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 375 (Ma-
thias Siems & David Cabrelli eds., 2013) (empirical finding that “the [United 
States] tends to favour directors more often than other countries”); William W. 
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federal-
ism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 621 (2006) (“Externalities do occur because 
Delaware’s strategy structurally favors management on allocational ques-
tions.”); Glynn, supra note 49, at 1069 (“Because managers will select the law 
that favors their interests, states competing for corporate charters (most nota-
bly Delaware) craft corporate legal norms to appeal to managers, not to all firm 
stakeholders.”). 
 104. In a pamphlet printed and distributed by the Delaware Department of 
State, Black describes the “source of Delaware’s prestige—even cachet” as in-
cluding: 
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actions may be brought and, within limits discussed below, what 
courts may adjudicate them. 
1. Modeling State Competition 
Three models compete to explain the states’ choices of what 
packages to offer. In the competition model, substantially all 
states compete to attract all incorporations. In the defensive-
competition model, Delaware competes for all incorporations 
while the other states compete only for the incorporations of cor-
porations headquartered within their borders. In the no-compe-
tition model, no state competes because Delaware has already 
won. My data suggest that the competition model best describes 
the operation of this subsystem. 
a. The No-Competition Model 
Professors Kahan and Kamar, the leading proponents of the 
no-competition model, claim that corporate charter competition 
is a myth.105 They acknowledge that states are changing their 
corporation codes in ways that make the codes more attractive 
to corporations, but argue that the increasing attractiveness is 
merely an “incidental effect.”106 “No state other than Delaware,” 
they say, “is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorpora-
tions of public companies.”107 Other leading scholars agree.108 
 
the Delaware General Corporation Law which is one of the most ad-
vanced and flexible corporation statutes in the nation. It includes the 
Delaware courts and, in particular, Delaware’s highly respected corpo-
rations court, the Court of Chancery. It includes the state legislature 
which takes seriously its role in keeping the corporation statute and 
other business laws current. It includes the Secretary of State’s Office 
which thinks and acts more like one of the corporations it administers 
than a government bureaucracy. 
BLACK, supra note 86, at 1. See Klausner, supra note 26, at 843 (“A state’s char-
ter is a large package of contract terms, which includes the state’s substantive 
and procedural laws, the right to use the state’s judiciary to resolve disputes, 
and access to its bar for legal advice and representation.”). 
 105. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 684 (“The thesis of this Article is that 
the very notion that states compete for incorporations is a myth. Other than 
Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of 
public companies.”). 
 106. Id. at 701 (“Of course, states occasionally take actions, such as revising 
their corporation codes, that have the incidental effect of making them more 
attractive as corporate domiciles.”). 
 107. Id. at 723 n.154. 
 108. E.g., Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“Rational legislators in other states 
will presumably realize the futility of competing with Delaware.”); Daines, su-
pra note 84, at 1600 (“There is simply no meaningful actual competition for 
national firms outside of Delaware.”); Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law 
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The essence of Kahan and Kamar’s argument is that states 
other than Delaware are charging such low fees and taxes that 
they cannot derive significant revenues from incorporations. Be-
cause the states cannot derive significant revenues from compe-
tition, Kahan and Kamar conclude that competition cannot be 
occurring.109 
Kahan and Kamar misperceive the competition in three re-
spects. First, the competition is not merely a competition for fees 
and taxes. It is a competition to attract investment to the state 
by appearing business friendly. To accomplish that, states stra-
tegically conflate the attraction of businesses with the attraction 
of incorporations.110 
Second, Kahan and Kamar disregarded competitive efforts 
that they considered to be unsuccessful. Delaware has actual 
 
Too Big To Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 77 (2008) (stating that “no other state 
actively seeks the incorporation business,” that “Delaware is alone in the re-
chartering market” and the “few states that tried to compete on one level or 
another have stopped doing so”). 
 109. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 748 (“Even if they attracted a sub-
stantial number of public corporations, they would neither earn meaningful ad-
ditional franchises taxes under their current tax structures nor profit signifi-
cantly from an increase in legal business. Accordingly, they do preciously little 
to attract incorporations.”). 
 110. LEGISLATIVE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 71ST SESSION OF THE NEVADA 
LEGISLATURE BY THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION’S SUBCOMMITTEE TO ENCOUR-
AGE CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES TO ORGANIZE AND CON-
DUCT BUSINESS IN THIS STATE 4 (2000), https://perma.cc/WS7B-UUQA (refer-
ring to “18 recommendations designed to promote business incorporation and 
retention and economic development and diversification in Nevada”); N.C. 
COMM’N ON BUS. LAWS & ECON. ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1995) (“There is no reason 
why the legal environment of North Carolina should not be as attractive to busi-
ness as its physical environment (thereby inducing out-of-state corporations to 
incorporate here) so long as changes in that environment can be made without 
adversely affecting other constituencies within the state.”); CT Seeks To Chal-
lenge Delaware’s Business-Friendly Legal Environment, HARTFORD BUSI-
NESS.COM (June 9, 2014), http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20140609/ 
PRINTEDITION/306069911/ct-seeks-to-challenge-delaware (discussing Con-
necticut’s “10-year plan to challenge and eventually overtake Delaware as the 
leading state in the country for businesses and corporations to locate, incorpo-
rate and do business”).  
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competitors. At present, Nevada,111 Maryland,112 Oklahoma,113 
Connecticut,114 North Dakota,115 South Dakota,116 and Wyo-
ming117 are either actively competing or preparing to do so. Ka-
han and Kamar discussed Nevada and Maryland’s efforts to 
compete for incorporations, but dismissed Nevada’s efforts as di-
rected mainly at nonpublic companies, Maryland’s as directed at 
 
 111. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liabil-
ity-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized 
on this opportunity by offering, and aggressively marketing, a unique product—
a no-liability corporate law—that has proven attractive to a subset of American 
companies.”). 
 112. Jay C. Hartzell et al., The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public 
Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J.L. & ECON. 539, 
545–46 (2008) (finding that sixty-eight percent of real estate investment trusts 
making initial public offerings chose to incorporate in Maryland). Maryland has 
modified its Corporations and Associations Code to accommodate real estate in-
vestment trusts; forty-four provisions expressly refer to them. MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 1-101 to 12-1006 (West 2017). The corresponding number 
for California’s Corporations code is sixteen. Only four provisions of Delaware’s 
General Corporation Law chapter of title 8 (Corporations), and twelve provi-
sions of title 6 (Commerce and Trade), expressly refer to real-estate investment 
trusts.  
 113. Oklahoma adopted the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1986. Af-
ter the ATP Tour decision in 2014, Oklahoma amended its corporation law to 
provide that “[i]n any derivative action instituted by a shareholder of a domestic 
or foreign corporation, the court . . . upon final judgment, shall require the non-
prevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party or parties the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees . . . incurred as a result of such action.” OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1126(c) (West 2014); see ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis 
Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 114. CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, exhibit 1 (showing chart com-
paring Connecticut and Delaware corporation laws “with the purpose of . . . rec-
ommending ways to attract and retain Connecticut businesses”). 
 115. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded 
Corporations Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2008) (stating that 
North Dakota’s “idea” is to “attract incorporations away from Delaware by being 
more shareholder-friendly than Delaware”). 
 116. Seth Tupper, Look Out, Delaware: Here Comes South Dakota, RAPID 
CITY J. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/look-out 
-delaware-here-comes-south-dakota/article_f4625607-8bf6-517b-8c7a 
-0ea0397022a8.html (describing the newly elected South Dakota Secretary of 
State as “a Republican who campaigned on making South Dakota a haven for 
business incorporation [who] plans to dedicate a staff member to it and other 
special projects”). 
 117. Kevin G. Hall & Marisa Taylor, US Scolds Others About Offshores, but 
Looks the Other Way at Home, MCCLATCHY DC (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www 
.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article70008302.html (describ-
ing Wyoming’s aggressive competition for anonymous incorporation). Although 
I could find no evidence that Wyoming competes for public company incorpora-
tions, it is one of only five states that attracts more than it loses. See supra 
Table 1. 
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only investment companies, and both as not sufficiently success-
ful.118 In essence, they define Delaware’s competitors out of ex-
istence. 
Third, Kahan and Kamar implicitly assume that competi-
tion cannot exist without at least two active competitors. But 
other scholars have noted that charter competition will prevent 
corporate regulation even if Delaware is the only competitor.119 
That is, if Delaware were the only competitor, Delaware’s strat-
egy should be to continue to make its corporation law more at-
tractive to managers in order to further increase its market 
share and to fend off potential competitors who could enter at 
any time. Thus, so long as the internal affairs doctrine is in ef-
fect, corporate law will continue to evolve toward serving the in-
terests of the managers who choose the state of incorporation. 
b. The Defensive Competition Model 
Most scholars adhere to a model in which Delaware com-
petes to attract corporations and the corporations’ home states 
compete to retain corporations by changing their corporation 
laws defensively. The states’ motive for defensive competition 
cannot be filing fees and franchise taxes. If a corporation rein-
corporates to Delaware, Delaware gets filing fees and franchise 
taxes that would otherwise have gone to the home state, but the 
home state receives an equal amount of revenues from the newly 
foreign corporation’s registration to do business in the home 
state. More plausible explanations presented by the literature 
for defensive competition are, first, that local corporate interests 
lobby for their states to compete120 and, second, that home states 
compete in order to benefit local lawyers who seek to retain the 
corporations as clients.121 
 
 118. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 716–22. 
 119. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Effi-
ciency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory 
Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 676 (1997) (claiming that “only one 
state, Delaware, competes for charters on a national basis”). 
 120. Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back 
in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2008) (“Although it 
is true that other state legislatures generally have followed Delaware’s lead on 
corporate law matters . . . this may be more attributable to successful local in-
terest group lobbying than to a strategic attempt to attract out-of-state incorpo-
rations.”). 
 121. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and 
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 (2006) 
(“The modus operandi for the states’ activity is most typically corporate lawyers 
acting in their self-interest and not government officials.”). 
 2128 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2101 
 
Scholars’ belief that charter competition is merely between 
Delaware and the home states122 is based on a series of studies 
of initial public offerings. Those studies report proportions of in-
corporation in states other than Delaware or the home state as 
ranging from three to seven percent123—levels the scholars re-
gard as de minimis. But nineteen percent of all public companies 
are now incorporated in states other than Delaware or the home 
state.124 A comparison of my 2015 statistics to Professor Subra-
manian’s 2000 statistics shows that home-state incorporations 
have declined sharply, while Delaware and other-state incorpo-
rations have both increased moderately.125 I conclude that char-
ter competition is not merely between Delaware and the corpo-
rations’ home states. 
c. The Competition Model 
As shown in Table 2, nineteen percent of public companies 
are incorporated in a state other than Delaware or the company’s 
home state. The competition model is the only one that can ac-
count for these companies. 
 
 122. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 420 (“The choice is thus not among 
a multitude of competitors for the national market but rather between incorpo-
rating in the home state or in Delaware.”); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, 
at 575 (“[F]irms in each local market are currently making a choice that is ef-
fectively between incorporating in their home state or in Delaware.”); Fisch, su-
pra note 63, at 1062 (“Corporations choose between incorporating in their home 
state and incorporating in Delaware. Virtually no corporation chooses any other 
alternative.”). 
 123. Broughman et al., supra note 102, at 872 (“Only 3.5 percent of sample 
firms choose to incorporate in a jurisdiction other than Delaware or their home 
state.”); Carney et al., supra note 61, at 147 (“In 93% of the IPOs, incorporation 
was in either Delaware or the home state.”); Daines, supra note 84, at 1562 (“In 
spite of all the debate about firms’ freedom to incorporate anywhere, the im-
portance of corporate law, and spirited state competition for charters, firms’ ac-
tual choices are much more mundane: 97% of public firms incorporate either in 
their home state or Delaware.”). 
 124. Infra Table 2. 
 125. In a study of all public company incorporations using 2000 Compustat 
data, Subramanian found “that 15% of [public] companies are incorporated nei-
ther in their home state nor in Delaware[,]” noting that “this statistic is some-
what at odds with the conventional view . . . that managers consider the charter 
decision to be between their headquarters state and Delaware.” Subramanian, 
supra note 77, at 1816. 
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Table 2: Trend in Public Company Place 
of Incorporation 
 
 Year 
Incorporation state 2000 2015 
Home state other than Dela-
ware 
2737 
(35%) 
1814 
(26%) 
Delaware 3910 (50%) 
3918 
(55%) 
Neither Delaware nor home 
state 
1173 
(15%) 
1329 
(19%) 
Total 7820 (100%) 
7061 
(100%) 
The 2000 data are from Subramanian. 
The 2015 data are from LoPucki. 
 
Delaware’s small size confers an advantage. As other schol-
ars have noted, small states are better suited to offensive com-
petition than large ones.126 The monetary prize for winning at 
the level that Delaware has is approximately one billion dollars 
a year.127 That is twenty-five percent of Delaware’s four billion 
 
 126. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 131 
(2009) (“Only smaller states are potential competitors, and they are few enough 
that internal politics could stymie each of them from emerging as effective on-
going competitors.”). To illustrate, the populations and population rankings of 
the four states most actively engaged in charter competition are Wyoming 
(579,000, rank 50); North Dakota (755,000, rank 46); Delaware (962,000, rank 
44); and Nevada (3 million, rank 32). State Population Totals and Components 
of Change: 2010–2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www 
.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/state-total.html. The most active for-
eign competitors are small island countries, including the Cayman Islands 
(62,348), Bermuda (61,070), Mauritius (1,268,315), and the Seychelles (95,235). 
Countries in the World by Population (2018), WORLDOMETERS, http://www 
.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country (last visited Apr. 
14, 2018). 
 127. DEFAC GENERAL FUND REVENUE WORKSHEET 1 (Sept. 19, 2017), 
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/defac/09_17/revenues.pdf (showing net 
franchise plus LP and LLC fees actually collected in fiscal year 2017 as $986.9 
million). 
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dollar annual budget,128 and so well worth Delaware’s competi-
tive effort. But it is only one-half of one percent of California’s 
$190 billion budget.129 
The benefits from small size do not, however, preclude 
larger competitors. In one respect, large states have greater in-
centives than small states to compete defensively. Large states 
are home to large numbers of public companies that pay fees and 
franchise taxes to Delaware. By matching Delaware’s benefits, a 
large state can relieve a large number of local companies from 
having to pay Delaware’s high cost of incorporation.130 
Nor does Delaware’s commitment preclude competition. 
Scholars differ over whether states must evidence a long-term 
commitment to attract incorporations. Some attribute Dela-
ware’s success to such a commitment. They argue that the state’s 
dependence on incorporation revenues makes Delaware effec-
tively a corporate hostage, assuring the state’s future behav-
ior.131 Others have argued, however, that long-term commitment 
is unnecessary because reincorporation costs are low. A corpora-
tion can leave if and when its incorporation state becomes inhos-
pitable.132 
Corporate charter competition is alive and well, and Dela-
ware’s continued dominance is not inevitable. The competition 
model is the one that best describes the success of Nevada, Mar-
yland, and Massachusetts shown in Table 1 and the dispersion 
of formerly home-state incorporations show in Table 2. 
 
 128. STATE OF DEL., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, FISCAL YEAR 2016 OPERAT-
ING AND CAPITAL BUDGET SUMMARY 8 (2016), https://budget.delaware.gov/ 
budget/fy2016/documents/budget-summary.pdf (estimating a general fund op-
erating budget of $3,908.5 million for fiscal year 2016). 
 129. See Brandon Martin, California’s State Budget: The Governor ’s Pro-
posal, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 1 (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.ppic.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/JTF_Budget0118JTF.pdf (reporting California’s proposed 2018–2019 
budget as $190.3 billion). 
 130. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware 
Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (describing the process 
used by Georgia to match its corporate laws to those deployed in Delaware). 
 131. Romano, supra note 28, at 240 (referring to the “hostage theory of the 
states’ conduct in the charter market”). 
 132. Black, supra note 2, at 589 (“If the cost of re-incorporating is low, the 
gains from midstream opportunism are low as well, and the hostage is super-
fluous.”). 
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2. The Corporate-Law Production Subsystems 
Each state assembles and offers a corporate-law package 
consisting of a corporation law, a method for amending it, a ju-
dicial system, and an administrative agency. The statutes and 
agencies are similar across states. Delaware, as previously 
noted, provides a court system more highly specialized in corpo-
rate law than other states can offer. This Section addresses the 
differences in amendment methods, which have important ef-
fects on speed and responsiveness.  
States change their corporate-law packages by enacting 
laws. The formal process is the same as that for changing other 
laws of the state. But two relevant informal differences exist. 
First, thirty-two states have adopted some version of the 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)133 and even some non-
MBCA-adopting states have adopted particular provisions of the 
MBCA.134 In essence, those states have outsourced the produc-
tion of their corporate law and, to some degree, surrendered con-
trol over it. 
In substance, the MBCA is similar to the Delaware law,135 
and the MBCA’s adopters include both states that actively com-
pete for charters and states that do not.136 The drafters of the 
 
 133. The Model Act today is the general corporation statute for thirty-two 
states and the District of Columbia, and is the source of many provisions in the 
general corporation statutes of other states. 2016 Revision to Model Business 
Corporation Act Makes Its Debut, BUS. L. TODAY (Dec. 2016), https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/12/mbca-201612 
.authcheckdam.pdf. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (CORP. LAWS COMM., 
revised 2016). 
 134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT; Jeffrey Beck with Zachary Redman, Nevada: 
Delaware of the West?, DEAL LAWS., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 1 (“In 1991 and 1995, 
for example, the Nevada Legislature revamped its mergers and consolidations 
law through the enactment of provisions derived or adapted from the Model 
Business Corporation Act . . . to incorporate uniform procedures for mergers, 
equity exchanges, and conversions.”). 
 135. See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harbor for Of-
ficer Reliance: Comparing the Approaches of the Model Business Corporation Act 
and Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 173 
(2011) (“Under both the MBCA and Delaware law, directors and officers owe 
essentially the same fiduciary duties to a corporation and its stockholders.”); 
Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 
99, 129 (2004) (“The MBCA is generally similar to Delaware law, with some 
fairly notable differences.”). 
 136. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (recommending that 
Connecticut continue to pattern its corporate laws after the MBCA); id. at 1–20 
(discussing Connecticut’s desire to supplant Delaware as the leading venue in 
which to incorporate). Wyoming and South Dakota are also MBCA-adopters 
that compete for charters. See State Corporation Laws, U.S. LEGAL, https:// 
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MBCA and Delaware statutes seem to share the same pro-pri-
vate-ordering philosophy. Both pride themselves on receiving 
outside input137 and copy each other’s work.138 As a result, the 
laws are probably about equally attractive. 
The principal difference is that the MBCA drafters tend to 
adopt bright-line rules, including MBCA rules regarding fiduci-
ary duties, while the Delaware drafters prefer vagueness and in-
determinacy.139 The difference in judicial capabilities seems to 
be driving that difference in drafting policy. Because Delaware 
has specialized courts, it can deliver flexible law that its courts 
adjust at the time they apply it. Because the MBCA states lack 
specialized corporate courts, they must spell out the rules in 
their statutes.140 
The second informal difference is that Delaware’s in-state 
drafting process enables Delaware to act more quickly and re-
spond more directly to competitive considerations.141 The de 
facto drafter of the MBCA is the twenty-four member Corporate 
Laws Committee of the American Bar Association’s Business 
Law Section (the “Committee”);142 the de facto drafter of the Del-
aware statute is the twenty-two member Council of the Corpo-
rate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association (the 
 
corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/state-corporation-laws (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
 137. Jeffrey M. Gorris et al., Delaware Corporate Law and the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 
116 (Winter 2011) (“The Council, similar to the Committee on Corporate Laws, 
receives input from a national constituency about areas for statutory improve-
ment.”). 
 138. Id. at 107 (stating that the “central point of this article is that there has 
been a constructive symbiosis” between the MBCA and Delaware law). 
 139. Id. at 116 (referring to “MBCA’s propensity to build bright-line rules 
into the statute in an attempt to create greater certainty”); E. Norman Veasey, 
On Corporate Codification: A Historical Peek at the Model Business Corporation 
Act and the American Law Institute Principles Through the Delaware Lens, 
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 105 (Winter 2011) (acknowledging the author ’s 
preference for “the indeterminacy of the Delaware law”). 
 140. See, e.g., Gorris et al., supra note 137, at 108 (acknowledging that “the 
current MBCA remains arguably a better model than the current DGCL for 
states lacking Delaware’s highly developed judicial system and corporate case 
law”). 
 141. E.g., id. at 116 (“The Council, similar to the [ABA’s] Committee on Cor-
porate Laws, receives input from a national constituency about areas for statu-
tory improvement; but the Council acts faster to address new issues and pro-
posed changes.”). 
 142. Corporate Laws Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N (last modified Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL270000. 
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“Council”).143 Both offer comment periods before finalizing their 
work.144  
The drafters differ in that Council members are Delaware 
lawyers, responsible only to Delaware, and free to pursue Dela-
ware’s interest in maintaining its revenue flow.145 By contrast, 
Committee members are from a diversity of states and are draft-
ing for states other than their own—states that have a variety of 
interests other than charter competition. Delaware’s Council 
meets secretly, whenever necessary, and the Delaware legisla-
ture adopts its recommendations without process or delibera-
tion.146 By contrast, the Committee meets four times a year, 
without regard to legislative schedules.147 In most MBCA-adopt-
ing states, corporate bar associations and other interest groups 
actively participate in the legislative process and slow it down.  
Non-MBCA-adopting states, such as Nevada, could in the-
ory adopt Delaware’s process. But the non-MBCA states tend to 
be larger, and larger states are more likely to have interest 
groups that will insist on participation in the legislative pro-
cess.148 
The speed of Delaware’s response proved decisive in the 
largest corporate law upheaval of the modern era. In its 1985 
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held directors personally liable for damages in the sale of a $690 
million company.149 The case immediately became a corporate 
 
 143. E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2006) (“[F]or decades now the 
function of identifying and crafting legislative initiatives in the field of corporate 
law has been performed by the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State 
Bar Association. In particular, it is the governing body of the Corporation Law 
Section—its Council—that develops such initiatives.”). 
 144. Id. at 1758 (noting that the Council’s recommendations must be ap-
proved by the Corporation Law Section and the Delaware Bar ’s Executive Com-
mittee before being submitted to the legislature). 
 145. The Council is comprised of Delaware State Bar Association members 
and lacks any non-Delaware lawyers. Id. at 1755–56. 
 146. Id. at 1754 (“The members of the Delaware General Assembly, how-
ever, have not taken on any significant role in initiating or drafting changes to 
the DGCL. Nor are those amendments the product of any legislative staff, or of 
any lobbyists engaged by individual businesses.”). 
 147. See Corporate Laws Committee, supra note 142 (noting that the Com-
mittee has “[t]hree standalone in-person meetings a year plus an in-person 
meeting at the Business Law Section Spring Meeting”). 
 148. For example, California and New York are non-MBCA states. See State 
Corporation Laws, supra note 136. 
 149. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). 
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cause célèbre.150 Delaware quickly enacted legislation allowing 
companies to exculpate directors of all liability for breach of the 
duty of care, making it the only state in which a corporation 
could do so.151 Professor Sarath Sanga reports that “[f]ollowing 
the adoption of [the exculpation legislation], the reincorporation 
rate [to Delaware] spiked more than five-fold and achieved an 
historical maximum. Within three years, the reincorporation 
rate returned to pre-shock levels.”152 By the speed of its re-
sponse, Delaware was able to convert a calamity of its own mak-
ing into a major source of new incorporations.  
In summary, Delaware’s system for amending its corporate-
law package provides Delaware with three important ad-
vantages. First, Delaware’s system allows the drafters to focus 
directly on competitive advantage. Second, Delaware can more 
quickly and easily amend its package legislatively, because the 
process is entirely in-state and interest groups other than the 
state bar do not participate. Third, by their rulings in cases, Del-
aware’s courts can amend the package without legislation. 
D. COURT REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS 
The third subsystem of the system for corporate regulation 
is the one by which the incorporation states enforce their corpo-
ration laws. States can enforce some aspects of their laws admin-
istratively. For example, all states require that incorporators 
furnish information to the state as a condition of incorporation. 
If an incorporator does not furnish the information, the state can 
refuse the filing and the corporation does not come into exist-
ence.153 If a corporation fails or refuses to pay renewal fees or 
franchise taxes, its charter becomes void.154 If a corporation 
abuses or misuses its charter, the state can obtain an order from 
 
 150. E.g., Bryn R. Vaaler, 2.02(b)(4) or Not 2.02(b)(4): That Is the Question, 
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81 (Winter 2011) (describing the Van Gorkom 
decision as having “sent shock waves through the corporate world”). 
 151. Id. (“Faced with the fear of a mass exodus of qualified directors from 
the boardrooms of Delaware corporations, the Delaware legislature adopted sec-
tion 102(b)(7) of the DGCL within eighteen months [of the Van Gorkom deci-
sion].”). 
 152. Sarath Sanga, Network Effects in Corporate Governance 4 (Nw. Univ. 
Pritzker Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 17-31, 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086245. 
 153. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 106 (2018). 
 154. E.g., id. § 510 (voiding the charters of corporations that fail or refuse to 
pay fees or franchise taxes). 
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a court of the state revoking the charter.155 Pursuant to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward,156 the states have also reserved the power to revoke 
or amend charters by statute.157 The predominant view is that 
only the state that issued the charter can revoke it.158 In the ag-
gregate, those rights provide the states with virtually complete 
control over the states’ relationships with the corporations they 
charter. 
Those rights do not, however, entitle the chartering states 
to resolve corporations’ disputes with their stakeholders. In the 
absence of legislation or agreement, stakeholders can sue the 
corporation or its other stakeholders wherever they can obtain 
jurisdiction. Which courts resolve those disputes and how they 
resolve them can determine the nature and quality of the law a 
state can deliver to the state’s corporate customers. 
States can achieve greater control over the interpretation 
and enforcement of their corporate laws by providing and con-
trolling the courts that resolve disputes under them. Perhaps 
even more importantly, by providing and controlling the courts, 
states can obtain better feedback on the interpretation, enforce-
ment, and reception of their laws. That feedback may enable 
states to design and implement more attractive corporation 
laws. 
State control over the forums in which corporate stakehold-
ers can litigate potentially exists across a wide spectrum. At one 
extreme, a chartering state might provide that disputes among 
the corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders be 
resolved only in the chartering state’s courts.159 A state might 
 
 155. E.g., id. § 284 (granting the state court jurisdiction to “revoke or forfeit 
the charter of any corporation for abuse, misuse or nonuse of its corporate pow-
ers, privileges or franchises”). 
 156. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 157. E.g., tit. 8, § 394 (reserving the power to amend Delaware charters). 
 158. Montana v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), 484 B.R. 360, 370 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2012) (“[T]he courts of several states have held that jurisdiction to dissolve a 
corporation rests only in the courts of the state of incorporation.”). 
 159. A state cannot prevent another state from adjudicating a dispute under 
the first state’s laws, but other states could accede to such a requirement as a 
matter of comity. In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Tr., 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (“In my view, Delaware also cannot unilaterally preclude a sister state 
from hearing claims under its law.”); Sarah C. Haan, Federalizing the Foreign 
Corporate Form, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 925, 943 (2011) (“The notion that only a 
state’s own courts could “interfere with” or “control” a state’s corporations dis-
appeared, and courts interpreted the doctrine to mean that any court could ap-
ply the corporate law of the state of incorporation to an out-of-state corpora-
tion.”). 
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allow such disputes to be resolved by any court with jurisdiction 
over the parties, but allow the corporation—by a charter or by-
law provision—to require that resolution be only in the charter-
ing state’s courts.160 A state might provide a specialized court 
that hears only corporate-law cases, a specialized court that 
hears corporate and other business cases, or only courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction.161 The state might take steps to assure that the 
judges of its specialized courts have business expertise or require 
that its specialized courts publish their opinions.162 A state 
might allow the corporation to require that resolution be in any 
court of the corporation’s choosing.163 At the other extreme, a 
state might allow resolution of all disputes by arbitration164 or 
be legally unable to prevent charter or bylaw provisions requir-
ing that all disputes be resolved by arbitration.165 
Because Delaware charters fifty-five percent of public corpo-
rations, Delaware generates the largest proportion of corporate 
litigation.166 As a result, Delaware is able to provide a Chancery 
Court that has the highest degree of corporate specialization 
among the states.167 The effect is that Delaware has a high de-
gree of control over how its corporation law is interpreted and 
enforced and a high level of feedback on how to make its law 
more attractive. 
Delaware’s closest competitor, Nevada, generates a much 
smaller proportion of corporate litigation. Nevada provides a 
 
 160. E.g., tit. 8, § 115. 
 161. At present, no state has a court that hears only corporate-law cases. 
Numerous states have specialized business courts or business dockets. 
 162. Joshua Halen, Transforming Nevada into the Judicial Delaware of the 
West; How To Fix Nevada’s Business Courts, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 139, 143 (2015) 
(“The Nevada Chancery Subcommittee focused on four areas of improvement to 
the Nevada Business Courts: (1) the need for published opinions[;] (2) time to 
disposition of cases[;] (3) expertise of business court judges[;] and (4) establish-
ing judicial precedent.”). 
 163. This was the effect of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Boiler-
makers v. Chevron prior to the adoption of title 8, section 115 of the Delaware 
Code. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
 164. See, e.g., Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-
001111, 2013 WL 1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013) (enforcing an arbitration 
bylaw under Maryland law). 
 165. Allen, supra note 3, at 754–57 (discussing the availability of arbitration 
over state objections). 
 166. See supra Table 2. 
 167. Allen, supra note 3, at 808. 
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specialized “Business Court” at two locations within the state168 
and maintains that “[s]election of judges is based on their spe-
cialized experience in business litigation.”169 The Nevada Busi-
ness Court is, however, more a separate docket than a separate 
court. It does not publish its opinions.170 Delaware’s Chancery 
Court provides Delaware with substantially greater control over 
the interpretation and enforcement of Delaware’s corporation 
law than the Nevada Business Court provides to Nevada. That, 
in turn, gives Delaware an important advantage over Nevada in 
the charter competition. 
E. INSULATION FROM DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
An important feature of the system for corporate regulation 
is that the system is insulated from democratic control.171 In a 
simple model of democratic control, citizens elect representatives 
who enact legislation. That legislation contains the rules by 
which the society operates. 
In the system for corporate regulation, no group of citizens 
elects representatives who decide how corporations are regu-
lated. To put it another way, no point of entry exists through 
which any group of citizens can decide whether corporate regu-
lations are necessary. I consider the relevant groups of citizens 
in three categories: (1) citizens of incorporation states, such as 
Delaware; (2) citizens of doing-business states, such as Califor-
nia; and (3) citizens of the United States. 
1. Insulation from Citizens of Incorporation States 
Citizens of the incorporation state have the right, but not 
the power, to regulate public companies. The incorporation state 
citizens have that right only because the companies chose to in-
corporate there. The company likely chose the state because the 
 
 168. See, e.g., Business Courts, SILVERFLUME, https://www.nvsilverflume 
.gov/wN?businessCourts (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“The establishment of the 
business court is an embodiment of Nevada’s efforts to attract corporations and 
other business entities to organize in Nevada.”); id. (“Official business courts 
are established in Reno (Second Judicial District Court) and Las Vegas (Eighth 
Judicial District Court).”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Halen, supra note 162, at 165 (“The main concerns of the Business 
Courts have been its broad subject matter jurisdiction, retention of juries, and 
unpublished opinions.”). 
 171. Greenfield, supra note 41, at 142 (“Corporations located outside of Del-
aware can adopt Delaware’s laws for their internal affairs, leaving non-share-
holder stakeholders affected by those laws but with no democratic mechanism 
to influence those laws.”). 
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state does not impose significant regulation. If the incorporation 
state’s citizens do impose significant regulation, the company 
can reincorporate in a state whose citizens will not, and the com-
pany will remain unregulated. Regulation is thus beyond the cit-
izens’ power. 
Delaware’s legislative process illustrates the emptiness of 
its citizens’ choice. The citizens of Delaware elect the legislature, 
but the legislature does not hold hearings or deliberate with re-
spect to corporate law. It rubber-stamps the decisions of the Del-
aware corporate bar.172 Nor does the Delaware corporate bar 
have the power to impose significant regulation. If it tried, public 
companies would leave Delaware and Delaware would lose about 
twenty-five percent of its state revenues.173 Because the corpo-
rate charter competition exists, no one in Delaware has the 
power to impose significant corporate regulation, even if all con-
sidered it necessary for the nation’s economic system to operate 
well. 
2. Insulation from Citizens of Doing-Business States 
States have the right to regulate foreign corporations doing 
business within their borders.174 That right to regulate exists 
even though the company is incorporated elsewhere, provided 
that the regulation does not interfere with interstate com-
merce.175 
However, all fifty states have adopted the internal affairs 
doctrine as their conflicts of law rule with respect to public com-
panies.176 If a state merely adopts a corporate regulation, the 
regulation will not apply to the large majority of public compa-
nies because they are incorporated in other states.177 To make 
 
 172. See Hamermesh, supra note 143, at 1754. 
 173. DEFAC GENERAL FUND REVENUE WORKSHEET, supra note 127, at 1 
(recording Delaware’s net revenue for fiscal year 2017 as $3.9 billion, with net 
franchise and LP/LLC fees comprising $983.9 million of that total). 
 174. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) 
(“It has been held both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment that a State 
may impose on a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within 
its borders more onerous conditions than it imposes on domestic companies.”). 
 175. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS § 1:4 (3d ed. 2010) (“As a consequence of [corporations] being denied 
citizenship status, states may, as a valid exercise of their police powers, regulate 
foreign corporations conducting business within their borders, provided the reg-
ulations do not impermissibly affect commerce.”). 
 176. See supra note 52 and accompany text. 
 177. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (describing the impact of 
the internal affairs doctrine). 
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its regulation applicable to foreign corporations, the state would 
have to change its conflicts rule. 
Rejection of the internal affairs doctrine would put the re-
jecting state’s conflicts of law rule in conflict with that of every 
other state. As a result, the regulation enacted would apply only 
in cases filed in the enacting state. Other states would continue 
to apply the law of the incorporation state. Rejection would sig-
nal “business-unfriendliness,” and risk the loss of not just incor-
porations, but also some amount of business activity. 
As a result, the citizens of a state lack the power to regulate 
foreign corporations doing business in the state. The severe ad-
verse consequences following any attempt to regulate would not 
result from the regulation, but rather from the state’s disturb-
ance of the charter competition’s structure. The effect of that dis-
turbance would likely overwhelm the effect of the regulation. 
3. Insulation from Citizens of the United States 
Scholars agree that the federal government has the right to 
make corporate law, including the right to preempt the states 
from making it.178 The federal government actually regulates 
disclosure in connection with sales of securities and a small, un-
important miscellany of other matters.179 
Federal regulation is not, however, a point of entry through 
which U.S. citizens can decide whether corporate regulation is 
needed. Federal regulation would violate a long-standing norm, 
might itself be frustrated by international charter competition, 
and is impractical because the U.S. Senate is structured in a 
manner that gives Delaware an effective veto.180 
By long-standing tradition, the federal government regu-
lates only securities disclosures.181 The remainder of corporate 
 
 178. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 624 (“Congress could 
draw on the same Commerce Clause on which it draws in supplementing the 
state system to occupy the entire field of corporate law.”). 
 179. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat. 
745, 787–88 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)) (prohibiting 
personal loans to executives). 
 180. David R. Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 31, 33–34 (2003) (“[That Senators do not have equal intensities 
across issues] helps to promote continual vote-trading among members and 
across issues in the form of explicit or implicit logrolling. In the particular case 
of the U.S. Senate, the rules of that body that allow slowdowns give, in effect, 
extra stacks of trading chips to intense minorities that face not-so-intense ma-
jorities.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 181. E.g., James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and 
Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 179–82 (2017) (arguing that federal law 
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law is solely the province of the states. As Bratton and McCahery 
put it: 
In theory, under the prevailing norm, national regulation covers the 
securities markets and mandates transparency respecting firms with 
publicly traded securities, while internal corporate affairs are left to 
the states. In practice, federal lawmakers sometimes disregard the 
norm, entering into internal affairs as the national system grows epi-
sodically. But they follow a norm of cooperation even as they make 
these incursions. Federal regulators never structure interventions so 
as to disrupt the state equilibrium. They leave Delaware in 
place . . . .182 
The incursions to which Bratton and McCahery refer have been 
minimal. Even in the face of a “corporate governance crisis,”183 
the legislation Congress enacted was primarily addressed at dis-
closure and had no substantial effect on the rules regarding cor-
porate governance.184 
Even if the federal government imposed corporate regula-
tion, corporations might respond by incorporating in countries 
that did not regulate them, while continuing to do business and 
raise capital in the United States. The corporate law of the new 
countries of incorporation would apply,185 the United States 
 
should be confined to stock trading issues, while state law should operate in a 
separate domain free from federal interference); Roberta Romano, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1527 (2005) (“[T]he substantive corporate governance provisions [of Sar-
banes-Oxley] overstep the traditional division between federal and state juris-
diction . . . .”); id. at 1597 (claiming that “the SOX mandates . . . are not proper 
subjects for federal government action”). But see Robert Thompson, Delaware’s 
Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism, in CAN DELAWARE 
BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 
57, 62 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (“Federal rules regularly use 
disclosure requirements to muscle management toward a desired substantive 
result.”). 
 182. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 620. 
 183. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling 
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) (“[T]he corporate governance crisis in 
America, with Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both our system 
of mandatory rules, and of the contracting processes, which, together, constitute 
the infrastructure of the U.S. corporate governance system.” (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
 184. Veasey, supra note 139, at 97 (“Congress has moved in the direction of 
some federalization of corporate-governance structures by the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Yet, even with 
those federal intrusions, state-based corporate law, including the business judg-
ment rule, is mostly unharmed.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 185. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217–19 (Del. 1987) 
(applying the law of Panama to a company headquartered in the United States 
but incorporated in Panama). 
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would suffer the embarrassment of an incorporation outflow, 
and the corporations would remain unregulated.186 
Lastly, the U.S. Senate is structured in a manner that al-
lows Delaware to block any legislation that threatens its posi-
tion.187 Delaware has two Senators, the same number as states 
with forty times its population. Because Delaware’s intense fi-
nancial interest in preventing federal corporate regulation so 
overwhelms the state’s other interests, Delaware’s Senators can 
choose committee assignments, place holds on legislation,188 and 
trade their votes to prevent federal corporate regulation.189 
The failure to regulate corporate law is not the result of con-
temporary political decisions at either the state or federal level. 
Corporations doing business in the United States are beyond 
democratic control for historical reasons having nothing to do 
with current needs.190 
II.  DELAWARE’S JUDICIAL STRATEGY   
In the context of systems analysis, strategies are “changes 
in conduct by a system participant made with the intention to 
improve the participant’s treatment by the system.”191 This Part 
examines Delaware’s competitive strategy to determine its na-
ture and its effect on the system. The examination shows Dela-
ware’s strategy is principally judicial and highly dependent on 
Delaware’s ability to attract cases to its courts. 
Strategies are plans for achieving goals. Scholars agree that 
maintaining Delaware’s billion-dollar-a-year revenue flow from 
fees and franchise taxes is at least one of Delaware’s goals. They 
differ as to whether maintaining Delaware’s flow of shareholder 
 
 186. Bebchuk, supra note 64, at 1508 (“[E]ven when an issue is governed by 
a federal rule, companies may still have some ability to opt out of this rule by 
incorporating abroad.”). But see Haan, supra note 159, at 955–60 (showing that 
U.S. courts usually apply U.S. law to the issue of veil-piercing of non-U.S. cor-
porations). 
 187. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION 
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 123 (2005) (noting 
that Delaware Senator Joseph Biden “engineered the omission of venue reform 
from the [1996] omnibus bankruptcy bill” and that change allowed Delaware to 
continue its dominance of large, public company bankruptcy). 
 188. MARK J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “HOLDS” IN THE SENATE 1 
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43563.pdf (describing the process by which 
even a single senator can delay or prevent Senate action). 
 189. See Mayhew, supra note 180. 
 190. LOPUCKI, supra note 187, at 4–8 (explaining how Delaware achieved 
dominance in the charter competition in the period 1899–1913). 
 191. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1996). 
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litigation is a separate goal promoted by the Delaware bar for its 
own benefit,192 or an essential part of the state’s strategy for 
maintaining its revenue flow.193 
This Part argues for the latter view. Delaware has rationally 
chosen to maintain its case flow, because maintaining Dela-
ware’s case flow is essential to maintaining Delaware’s revenue 
flow. Delaware’s Chancery Court and body of precedent are 
widely acknowledged to be central to Delaware’s attractiveness. 
Without shareholder litigation, the Chancery Court would confer 
no advantage and its body of precedent would quickly become an 
historical artifact. Delaware’s judiciary is not an add-on; it is an 
essential part of the package Delaware offers. Delaware’s choice 
to double down on its risky judicial strategy is thus not an error 
but merely a demonstration of the precariousness of Delaware’s 
position. Other strategies present even greater risks to Dela-
ware’s continuation in its role as the nation’s de facto corporate 
lawgiver.  
A. DELAWARE’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGE 
Americans have a low opinion of large corporations.194 Main-
taining the legitimacy of a nondemocratic system that confers 
 
 192. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted 
Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 873 (2016) (arguing that the fee-shifting issue 
“presented an unprecedented conflict between the interests of the State and 
those of Delaware lawyers”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward 
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 
(1987) (“[T]he rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts to 
maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wil-
mington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private Enforcement?, COLUM. 
L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia 
.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-private 
-enforcement [https://perma.cc/QD6P-N9TX] (“Delaware is uniquely conflicted 
on this issue, because ATP Tour could imply a significant decline in Delaware-
based litigation, but such a decline would greatly benefit management and di-
rectors of Delaware corporations. Never before have the interests of the Dela-
ware bar and its clients clashed so directly.”). 
 193. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation By-
laws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1681 (2016) (concluding that Delaware’s prohibi-
tion on fee shifting bylaws “can be rationalized as preserving the critical com-
ponent of judicial lawmaking as part of the package that constitutes Delaware 
corporate law”). 
 194. See, e.g., Big Business, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5248/big 
-business.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting that, as of this writing, 
thirty-four percent of respondents were satisfied with “the size and influence of 
major corporations,” five percent were dissatisfied but wanted major corpora-
tions to have more influence, fifty percent were dissatisfied but wanted major 
corporations to have less influence, and nine percent were dissatisfied but 
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power and privilege on large corporations and allows them to 
regulate themselves is no small task. Despite that challenge, 
Delaware’s corporate-law regime is highly regarded.195 
Should the popular perception of Delaware corporate law 
turn sharply negative, Delaware could be replaced in a variety 
of ways. In Part III, I suggest that corporations might reject Del-
aware in favor of cheaper states, but that is only one of several 
possibilities. In extreme circumstances, the federal government 
might be able to enact regulatory corporate law or replace state 
chartering with federal chartering.196 States could reject the in-
ternal affairs doctrine and instead directly regulate the corpora-
tions headquartered or doing business within their borders.197 
 
wanted corporations to “keep [their] influence as it is now”); Views of Banks, 
Large Corporations, Small Businesses Improve Since 2010, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 
31, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/04/millennials-views 
-of-news-media-religious-organizations-grow-more-negative/ft_16-01-04_ 
millennialviews_improve (reporting the proportions of various groups “who say 
[large corporations] have a positive effect on the way things are going in this 
country today” as ranging from twenty-one to thirty-eight percent); The Burson-
Marsteller CNBC Corporate Perception Indicator, BURSON-MARSTELLER (Aug. 
15, 2014), http://www.burson-marsteller.com/what-we-do/our-thinking/the 
-burson-marstellercnbc-corporate-perception-indicator/the-burson 
-marstellercnbc-corporate-perception-indicator/#! (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) 
(finding on slide 14 that members of the general public in developed markets 
believe by a margin of forty-six to thirty-five percent “it is a bad thing when 
corporations are strong and influential, because they rig the system so they do 
not have to act responsibly”). 
 195. Allen, supra note 3, at 808 (referring to the Delaware Court of Chancery 
as “a highly regarded judiciary with the proven ability to act swiftly based upon 
a developed body of case law”); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 620 
(“Delaware legitimately plays a national role.”); Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen 
A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A 
Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 354 (2013) (“In the 
case of Delaware-chartered corporations, the incentive to have intra-corporate 
disputes resolved by Delaware courts is arguably even greater because of the 
high regard in which Delaware’s courts are held and the efficiency with which 
they resolve complex business disputes.”); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Compe-
tition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (“Delaware’s corporate law enjoys extraordinary respect 
and prestige, as do the state’s corporate lawyers and judges.”). 
 196. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2498 
(2005) (“In nearly every decade of the twentieth century, the decade's major cor-
porate law issue either went federal or federal authorities threatened to take it 
over.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 49, at 1096 (advocating that states abandon 
strict adherence to the internal affairs doctrine). 
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Private regulators such as stock exchanges or shareholder advi-
sory services could become the de facto regulators.198 Corpora-
tions themselves could reject charter competition in favor of a 
level playing field administered by some neutral institution. Al-
ternative forms of business organization, controlled by custom-
ers, employees, franchisees, local governments, or others could 
arise. 
Those possibilities put Delaware in a bind. To maintain its 
legitimacy, Delaware must appear to impose meaningful regula-
tion. But to attract incorporations, it must not impose meaning-
ful regulation. That may explain why corporate law hovers near 
emptiness but consistently avoids getting there. 
B. DELAWARE’S STRATEGY 
Delaware’s strategy for appearing to regulate without actu-
ally doing so has three elements: (1) Delaware portrays its law 
as authorizing a system of private ordering; (2) obscures its ac-
tual methods through verbosity and complexity; and (3) admin-
isters its grant of power and privilege through a loyal and so-
phisticated judiciary over which Delaware has substantially 
complete control. 
1. Private Ordering 
Delaware characterizes its lack of regulation as “private or-
dering.”199 The claim is that corporate law governs only the rela-
tionship among “the corporation and its current officers, direc-
tors, and shareholders.”200 Because that relationship is 
contractual and among sophisticated parties, it necessitates only 
minimal regulation. As then-Chancellor Strine put it: “Dela-
ware’s corporate statute is widely regarded as the most flexible 
in the nation because it leaves the parties to the corporate con-
tract (managers and stockholders) with great leeway to struc-
 
 198. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class 
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 1020 
(1999) (“An exchange-based antifraud regime harnesses the markets them-
selves as effective, low-cost monitors for fraud.”). 
 199. E.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, 
the Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leaves 
latitude for substantial private ordering.”). 
 200. See sources cited supra note 36. But see Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 
376–77 (“No corporate affairs are ever exclusively ‘internal’; they will always 
have consequences of greater or lesser magnitude on the ‘outside’ world.”). 
 2018] CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION 2145 
 
ture their relations, subject to relatively loose statutory con-
straints and to the policing of director misconduct through equi-
table review.”201 
Delaware’s defenders posit that the private ordering thus 
facilitated enables Delaware corporations to operate more effi-
ciently.202 Corporations incorporated in other states either 
struggle along at a competitive disadvantage, reincorporate to 
Delaware, or were incorporated in their home jurisdictions for 
noneconomic reasons.203 
The private ordering story fails to take into account the pow-
erful negotiating position that corporate law confers on manag-
ers,204 the inability of some affected parties to negotiate at all,205 
and the tremendous impact that the unregulated corporation 
has on society.206 But the ideology of private ordering serves its 
function by existing and remaining plausible as an explanation 
for, and defense of, corporate charter competition. 
2. Obfuscation 
The second element of Delaware’s strategy is obfuscation.207 
In reality, American corporate law is an absence of regulation 
 
 201. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del. 
Ch. 2004). 
 202. E.g., Romano, supra note 28, at 235 (claiming to show empirically “a 
bandwagon effect in favor of adopting a successful innovation” in the charter 
competition context). 
 203. Id. at 278 (“[T]he non-Delaware corporations stressed historical associ-
ations with their incorporation state that created a public identification be-
tween state and firm.”). 
 204. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“[T]he uncertainty of Del-
aware law disguises the extent to which Delaware’s law favors managers over 
shareholders.”); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 621 (“Externalities do 
occur because Delaware’s strategy structurally favors management on alloca-
tional questions.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Governance and Social Wel-
fare in the Common-Law World, 92 TEX. L. REV. 973, 989 (2014) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013)) (“Del-
aware’s resolution of most corporate governance issues . . . tends to favor the 
interests of managers.”). 
 205. Cf. Crespi, supra note 39, at 90–91 (noting that a majority of courts 
apply the law of the state of incorporation to veil-piercing claims). Most tort 
creditors with veil-piercing claims cannot negotiate at all. 
 206. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 
894–96 (2018) (arguing that charter competition may prevent U.S. jurisdictions 
from banning entities controlled by malicious software). 
 207. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“Explicit, bright-line rules 
favoring managers could conceivably encourage shareholder groups to push for 
federal intervention. In contrast, indeterminate standards applied by courts in 
 2146 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2101 
 
that is effectively beyond democratic control.208 If generally un-
derstood, the current arrangement would be politically unac-
ceptable.209 The arrangement survives in large part because the 
complexity of the charter competition and the complexity, inde-
terminacy, and verbosity of the resulting law obscure it. 
More specifically, the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) lacks clarity,210 is excessively lengthy as a whole,211 is 
expressed in sentences that are themselves extraordinarily 
lengthy and complex,212 is deliberately redundant,213 and es-
chews the within-sentence-paragraphing that is used in nearly 
all other statutes and regulations to reduce ambiguity and make 
them easier to read. Delaware court opinions are also unneces-
sarily lengthy and obscure.214 They multiply legal distinctions 
 
case-specific ways make the extent to which Delaware’s law favors managers 
much less salient.”). 
 208. See supra Part I.E. 
 209. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 603 (“[I]ndeterminate standards 
applied by courts in case-specific ways make the extent to which Delaware’s law 
favors managers much less salient.”); Greenfield, supra note 41, at 136 (arguing 
that the “ability of corporations to elect their governance law is illegitimate as 
a democratic matter and inefficient as an economic matter”). 
 210. See Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 50 (“Even the briefest com-
parison of the Delaware statute’s language with the Model Act’s language 
demonstrates the Model Act’s much greater clarity and precision.”); Jens C. 
Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 56 (2013) (“Prominent voices in the literature 
argue that regulatory competition has made Delaware law inefficiently indeter-
minate.”). 
 211. The Delaware General Corporation Law is more than 100,000 words. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2018). By contrast, the Nevada Corporation Law is 
less than 50,000 words. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 75.010–92a.500 (2017). 
 212. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 50 (noting that the first sen-
tence of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) contains 952 words and is “virtually 
impossible to read”). 
 213. Harvard Law School Professor Holger Spamann has published a ver-
sion of the Delaware General Corporation Law that is half as long, without al-
teration of meaning, simply by removing redundancies. See Del. Gen. Corp. L., 
SIMPLIFIED CODES, http://simplifiedcodes.com/?page_id=39 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2018). 
 214. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) (“[T]he well-documented 
indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law . . . is evident in the state’s ample use 
of vague standards that make prediction of legal outcomes difficult. While Del-
aware law offers relatively clear rules that govern technical aspects of corporate 
governance, the fiduciary duties at its core are open-ended.”). 
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and categories excessively,215 describe them indeterminately,216 
and revise them frequently.217 These characteristics create pre-
cisely the opposite of the clear and predictable rules that schol-
ars assume business people prefer.218 Even on so simple a matter 
as which of the rules in its corporation law must be followed and 
which may be privately ordered away, Delaware law provides no 
answer.219 
Complexity and ambiguity enable Delaware to generate pat-
terns of outcomes that are directly in conflict with the apparent 
intent of the rules. One example of this subterfuge is that corpo-
rate directors nearly always escape liability for their own wrong-
doing.220 The techniques by which they do it—indemnification, 
directors’ and officers’ insurance, and court approval of share-
holder litigation settlement—together achieve a result that each 
individually purports to prevent. A second example is that direc-
tors have a duty of oversight, but the Delaware courts’ verbali-
zation of that duty makes it virtually impossible for directors to 
violate it.221 A third example is that corporate law ostensibly 
 
 215. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 12 (“[T]he set of decisions now 
contestable in court has grown exponentially.”); id. at 30 (showing graphically 
the large number of modes of review recognized in Delaware law). 
 216. Id. at 15–16 (“Delaware’s high reversal rate is consistent with Delaware 
law’s being so indeterminate that Delaware appellate and trial judges disagree 
on its application with relative frequency, their specialized expertise notwith-
standing.”); Kamar, supra note 214, at 1909; Fisch, supra note 63, at 1063 (“Del-
aware precedent . . . although well developed . . . is far from clear and predicta-
ble.”). 
 217. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 130, at 16–17 (stating that “new rules 
have been announced with remarkable regularity”). 
 218. See id. at 29–30 (citing other scholars’ arguments that the corporate 
laws of other states provide greater certainty than Delaware corporate law); 
Fisch, supra note 63, at 1099 (“[T]he standards[-]based muddiness of Delaware 
law retains a degree of ex post review for which courts are well suited.”). 
 219. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 847–48 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (rejecting the view that provisions of the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law that do not contain “magic words” authorizing modification by a 
provision in the certificate or bylaws cannot be modified by a provision in the 
certificate or bylaws). 
 220. Black et al., supra note 14, at 1138 (“As an empirical matter, out-of-
pocket liability for outside directors over the last several decades has been 
rare.”). 
 221. For example, the first prong of the Caremark test is breached only if 
“the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system 
or controls.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 
(Del. 2006). To fail the test, a corporation would have to have no accounting 
system at all. 
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bars directors with conflicts of interest from controlling corpo-
rate decisions.222 But at the same time, the law requires that the 
courts ignore structural bias—the cultural obligation to recipro-
cate when a friend or confidant selects one to become a board 
member. The effect is to enable conflicted directors to control cor-
porate decisions indirectly across a wide range of situations by 
delegating the decisions to friends and confidants.223 
A second function of complexity is to shield Delaware corpo-
rate law from criticism by diffusing the criticism’s target. A 
vaguely and abstractly stated legal doctrine, qualified by state-
ments scattered throughout a lengthy opinion, is difficult to crit-
icize because it can neither be repeated nor credibly summa-
rized. Similarly, it is difficult to prove that Delaware fails to 
regulate corporations when Delaware’s corporation law is more 
than 100,000 words in length.224 No matter how many provisions 
are shown to be void of regulation, the possibility remains that 
others are not. 
A third function of complexity is to make Delaware law dif-
ficult to copy. As Kahan and Kamar put it, “fact-intensive and 
standard-based law also bolsters Delaware’s market power. It is 
hard for other states to replicate such law and to tap Delaware’s 
network and learning benefits.”225 Proving the ability of Dela-
ware judges to express matters clearly when they want to, Chief 
Justice Leo Strine summarized: “By making its law a muddle, 
Kahan and Kamar say, Delaware makes it difficult for other 
states to copy it.”226 
Finally, Delaware’s tolerance for complexity and indetermi-
nacy gives its courts the flexibility to constantly generate new 
 
 222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2018). 
 223. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 647 (Del. 2014) (holding 
that a director who had been the controlling shareholder ’s business partner for 
twenty years was independent for the purpose of representing the interests of 
the minority shareholders in reviewing the controlling shareholder ’s offer to 
purchase their shares). 
 224. See supra note 211. 
 225. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for 
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1247 n.170 (2001); Kahan & Kamar, 
supra note 1, at 741 (“[Delaware’s] law would be vulnerable to emulation at low 
costs if it were more determinate.”). But see Kamar, supra note 214, at 1910–11 
(“[T]he substantive content of Delaware law is unlikely to form a major basis of 
Delaware’s competitive advantage, since other jurisdictions can easily copy this 
content . . . .”). 
 226. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate 
America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to 
Kahan & Kamar ’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1264 n.33 (2001). 
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rules and exceptions to existing rules. That in turn enables them 
to favor managers in the case before the court without creating 
precedent that would bind them in future cases.227 
3. Judicial Regulation 
Judicial regulation is the third element of Delaware’s strat-
egy. Instead of seeking to provide the right rules, Delaware long 
ago elected to avoid rules and instead regulate on a case-by-case 
basis.228 As Professor Jill Fisch has noted, “Delaware corporate 
law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater extent than other 
states.”229 Fiduciary standards and standards of review domi-
nate Delaware corporate law. Delaware’s statutes include nei-
ther.230 The vagueness and complexity of Delaware’s judicial 
opinions make it difficult to predict how the courts will decide 
future cases. Delaware’s proponents all but concede that, with-
out its courts, Delaware would have no advantage over other 
states.231 
The function of this ambiguity is to enable Delaware to ad-
dress threats to its reputation,232 while permitting managers 
who do not pose such threats to do virtually anything they 
please.233 Professor Edward Rock observes: 
 
 227. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate 
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (characterizing Delaware cor-
porate law as “a set of stories that is typically not reducible to a rule”). 
 228. Fisch, supra note 63, at 1076 (“Delaware courts also apply the relevant 
legal standards in a fact and case specific manner. As a result, one court’s de-
termination that a particular course of dealing was reasonable under the rele-
vant legal test provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent de-
cisions applying the same legal test.”). 
 229. Id. at 1074. 
 230. Id. at 1074–75. 
 231. Gorris et al., supra note 137, at 108 (“[T]he current MBCA remains ar-
guably a better model than the current DGCL for states lacking Delaware’s 
highly developed judicial system and corporate case law.”). 
 232. In Puda Coal, two directors in China stole all of the assets of a public 
Delaware company eighteen months before the three U.S. directors realized it. 
30 F. Supp. 3d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In rejecting the technically sound argument 
of the U.S. directors for a resolution that would leave the shareholder derivative 
action in the control of one of the wrongdoers, Chancellor Strine noted the in-
terests of Delaware: “I’m just wondering how, if my state embraces this, we are 
not subject to totally legitimate ridicule.” Transcript of Oral Argument and the 
Court’s Ruling at 6–7, In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litig. (Del. Ch. Feb. 
19, 2013) (No. 6476-CS). 
 233. See Rock, supra note 227, at 1013 (“[T]he Delaware courts provide a 
supplemental source of gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors who 
are beyond the reach of the firm’s normal systems of social control.”); id. at 1106 
(“The core of my claim is that we should understand Delaware fiduciary duty 
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Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long 
as it is not illegal, and as long as they act in good faith . . . . [T]he for-
mulation is largely empty until the concept of good faith is defined. . . . 
[T]he Delaware courts fill out the concept of “good faith” through fact-
intensive, normatively saturated descriptions of manager, director, 
and lawyer conduct, and of process—descriptions that are not reducible 
to rules . . . .234 
Courts can use doctrines such as bad faith, proper purpose, and 
reasonableness to distinguish litigants who have done some-
thing in a clumsy or striking manner—with the potential to em-
barrass Delaware—from other litigants who have reached the 
same end in a graceful and inconspicuous manner that poses no 
threat to Delaware. By making that distinction, Delaware can 
maximize its delegation of privilege and power, while minimiz-
ing risks to its legitimacy. 
Delaware’s strategy requires that the state maintain its own 
court system.235 First, judges must take Delaware’s interests 
into account, even though those interests are not legally rele-
vant. That is, judges must decide cases in ways that protect the 
state’s efforts to sell charters.236 Only judges employed by Dela-
ware have direct incentives to do that. Second, the lawyers who 
practice before the Delaware Chancery Court are the principal 
source of information and advice to the Delaware Legislature. 
The lawyers function as the legislature’s eyes and ears and as a 
check on Delaware’s judiciary.237 The requirement that each 
maintain an office in the state assures these lawyers’ loyalty to 
the state.238 Third, Delaware’s delivered law is largely a product 
of Delaware’s judicial culture.239 The results would be markedly 
 
law as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors, 
tales that collectively describe their normative role.”). 
 234. Id. at 1015. 
 235. See Veasey, supra note 139, at 96 (“A rational corporation law or corpo-
rate-governance regime, such as Delaware’s, depends on a rich body of case law 
and the expertise, prompt service, and independence of, and trust in, the judici-
ary.”). 
 236. See, e.g., supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
 238. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 170(a) (“Any person admitted to practice in the Su-
preme Court of this State shall be entitled to practice as an attorney in this 
Court so long as such person . . . maintains an office in this State for the practice 
of law.”). 
 239. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Del-
aware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on 
Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“Enabling acts, 
such as the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), are part of the corpo-
rate law. They create only a skeletal framework, however. The ‘flesh and blood’ 
of corporate law is judge-made.”). 
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different if the judges of other states or arbitrators applied Del-
aware law. As Chancellor Strine put it:  
The important coherence-generating benefits created by our judiciary’s 
handling of corporate disputes are endangered if our state’s compelling 
public policy interest in deciding these disputes is not recognized and 
decisions are instead routinely made by a variety of state and federal 
judges who only deal episodically with our law.240 
Lastly, judicial lawmaking through a small, concentrated judici-
ary without juries further renders Delaware’s system impervi-
ous to copying.241  
Thus Delaware is committed to a strategy that maintains 
and leverages the existence of its uniquely specialized court sys-
tem. To abandon its judicial strategy would leave Delaware with 
little more than its vaunted reputation and its familiarity. To 
stick with its judicial strategy, Delaware must attract both in-
corporations and cases. Change that threatens the flow of Dela-
ware litigation threatens Delaware. 
C. THE JUDICIAL STRATEGY’S DECLINE 
Despite the inherent conflict between the policies that will 
attract incorporations and those that will attract shareholder lit-
igation, Delaware managed to do both until 2001. That year, the 
Delaware Chancery Court cut the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in the 
Digex case.242 The court continued making cuts in later cases.243 
Although the numbers of business organization cases filed in the 
Chancery Court has remained roughly the same since then, Del-
aware is apparently suffering substantial losses in its market 
share of the litigation against Delaware corporations.244 
To stem the loss of market share, Delaware employed two 
strategies simultaneously. First, in early 2009, Delaware began 
offering Delaware corporations secret arbitration by Chancery 
 
 240. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 241. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 708 (noting that the Delaware 
Chancery Court “hears all cases without a jury”). 
 242. See John Armour et al., supra note 8, at 1371 (“[The] law firm sought 
approval for a $24.75 million fee [but was] instead awarded $12.3 million . . . .”). 
 243. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LE-
GAL STUD. 605, 643–45 (2012) (attributing Delaware’s loss of shareholder liti-
gation to “more intensive fee scrutiny” beginning with the Digex fee cut in 2001). 
 244. Id. at 607 (reporting “a large decline in the proportion of corporate law-
suits involving Delaware companies . . . filed in Delaware courts” after 2001, 
based on data for the period 1994–2010); Stevelman, supra note 195, at 61 
(“[D]isputes in high-profile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions and 
allegations of fiduciary self-dealing governed by Delaware corporate law are 
more commonly being litigated outside of Delaware’s state courts.”). 
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Court judges “in a Delaware courthouse during normal business 
hours.”245 The authorizing legislation declared that the state did 
so to “preserve Delaware’s preeminence in offering cost-effective 
options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving com-
mercial, corporate, and technology matters.”246 This secret arbi-
tration option would have made Delaware’s Chancery Court 
more attractive, but in a two-to-one decision in 2013, the Third 
Circuit ruled that secret arbitration before sitting judges vio-
lated the First Amendment right of public access to government 
dispute resolution proceedings.247 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari,248 and Delaware responded by abandoning the arbi-
tration of shareholder litigation altogether.249 
The second strategy, forum-selection bylaws, met with quick 
success. In early 2010, a Delaware Chancery Court judge sug-
gested that Delaware corporations adopt bylaws limiting the 
venues in which their shareholders could sue them.250 Over 250 
publicly traded companies adopted forum-selection bylaws even 
before the Delaware Chancery Court validated them in 2013.251 
Technically, Boilermakers v. Chevron allowed forum-selection 
bylaws to direct shareholder litigation anywhere.252 But shortly 
after the decision, the Delaware legislature limited forum-selec-
tion bylaws to directing litigation solely to Delaware.253 Dela-
ware’s new strategy was then clear. Instead of trying to attract 
plaintiff ’s attorneys to file their cases in Delaware, Delaware 
 
 245. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 246. H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009). 
 247. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 733 F.3d at 521. 
 248. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
 249. See Delaware’s Options for Alternative Dispute Resolution, DELA-
WARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/alternative-dispute-resolution (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2018) (noting that Delaware courts offer mediation and appoint 
arbitrators). 
 250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would 
provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then cor-
porations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive fo-
rum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
 251. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 
939, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 252. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 230–
31 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a bylaw directing litigation to the corporations’ 
home states). 
 253. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2018) (“[N]o provision of the certificate of 
incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing [internal corporate] claims 
in the courts of this state.”). 
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and its corporations would join forces to require plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to file their cases in Delaware. From 2010 through 2015, 
the number of business cases filed in the Delaware Chancery 
Court increased by more than sixty percent.254 
In 2014, the conflict between attracting incorporations and 
attracting litigation resurfaced with the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund 
(ATP Tour).255 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
a bylaw that required the members of a nonprofit corporation—
the equivalent of shareholders—to pay the corporation’s attor-
neys’ fees if they sued but did not win the “full remedy sought.”256 
The ATP Tour decision would have discouraged shareholder lit-
igation and probably delighted corporate managers. The Dela-
ware legislature quickly reversed the decision by prohibiting all 
fee-shifting bylaws.257 The Council made the decision for the Del-
aware legislature. The Council explained that “few stockholders 
will rationally be able to accept the risk of exposure to millions 
of dollars in attorneys’ fees to attempt to rectify a perceived cor-
porate wrong, no matter how egregious.”258 By reversing ATP 
Tour, Delaware was deliberately allowing shareholders to con-
tinue suing its corporations. 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge characterizes Delaware’s re-
versal of ATP Tour as a “self-inflicted wound”259 that “threatens 
to undermine Delaware’s profitable position as the leading state 
of incorporation.”260 Bainbridge argues that shareholder litiga-
tion is excessive, corporations’ “key constituencies” could have 
used fee-shifting bylaws to reduce the inefficient portions of it, 
and Delaware’s prohibition of fee-shifting bylaws will cause Del-
aware corporations to reincorporate in states that permit fee-
shifting bylaws.261 
 
 254. See infra Figure 2. 
 255. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 256. Id. at 560. 
 257. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2018) (“The bylaws may not contain 
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees 
or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal 
corporate claim . . . .”). 
 258. COUNCIL EXPLANATION, supra note 27, at 4. 
 259. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 876. 
 260. Id.; see also DiCiancia, supra note 7, at 1574 (“[T]he Delaware courts 
have a strong interest in authorizing fee shifting in securities class actions to 
protect this status.”). 
 261. Bainbridge, supra note 192, at 870–71, 875 (discussing specific states). 
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While the controversy over ATP Tour continued, yet another 
case-retention problem erupted. In January 2016, the Delaware 
Chancery Court refused to approve a “disclosure settlement”262 
in the Trulia shareholder litigation.263 The court was concerned 
that the additional information Trulia furnished to the share-
holder class pursuant to the settlement would not have been 
meaningful, while $375,000 of corporate funds would have been 
paid to the plaintiffs’ attorneys264 and the corporate defendant 
would have received a release that might have prevented other 
shareholders from later filing meritorious litigation.265 In its 
opinion refusing to approve the settlement, the court acknowl-
edged that its “enhanced judicial scrutiny of disclosure settle-
ments could lead plaintiffs to sue fiduciaries of Delaware corpo-
rations in other jurisdictions in the hope of finding a forum more 
hospitable to signing off on settlements of no genuine value,” im-
mediately adding that it “is within the power of a Delaware cor-
poration to enact a forum selection bylaw to address this con-
cern.”266 
 
 262. A disclosure settlement is a settlement in which the plaintiff share-
holder class receives nothing but additional information. John Marsalek et al., 
The Demise of Disclosure-Only Settlements?, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Jan. 28, 
2016), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/ 
01/demise-of-disclosure-only-settlements. 
 263. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 908 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 264. Id. at 890. 
 265. Id. at 898 (“[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements 
are likely to be met with continued disfavor . . . unless the supplemental disclo-
sures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject 
matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing 
more than disclosure claims . . . .”). 
 266. Id. at 899. 
 2018] CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION 2155 
 
Figure 2: Number of Business Organization Cases Filed 
in the Delaware Chancery Court 
 
 
But the corporations did not invoke forum selection bylaws. 
They preferred to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in, and get 
their releases from, more hospitable forums.267 Trulia sparked 
another large outflow of shareholder litigation from Delaware, 
erasing Delaware’s nominal gains in filings since 2010.268 
Figure 2 shows the number of “business organization” cases 
shown on the Delaware Chancery Court dockets posted on 
Westlaw. The increase from 2008 to 2014 and the decline 2015 
to 2016 are largely merger settlement litigation in which multi-
ple cases are filed, and nothing but settlement approval actually 
litigated. Delaware’s corporate cases probably declined in the pe-
riod from 2000 to 2004.269 
 
 267. Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions 
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE 
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven Davidoff Si-
mon & Randall S. Thomas, eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855950 (“[O]nce the corporation 
has become a defendant in merger litigation, that corporation has a strong in-
centive to buy the broad, cheap releases that disclosure settlements provide.”). 
 268. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING AC-
QUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGA-
TION 3 (2016) (“Plaintiffs filed in Delaware for 61 percent of the litigated deals 
over the first three quarters of 2015 but only 26 percent of litigated deals in [the 
fourth quarter of 2015 and the first half of 2016].”). 
 269. John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empiri-
cal Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 687, 705 fig. 1 (2009) (showing slight decline). 
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The outflow demonstrated a crucial limitation of Delaware’s 
litigation retention strategy. Forum-selection bylaws can force 
cases into Delaware only when the corporations want them 
there. To get cases, Delaware must compete against other state 
and federal courts. In that competition, the appeal of experi-
enced, astute, and courteous judges goes only so far. What forum 
shoppers want is to win their cases. If the Delaware Chancery 
Court will not rubber stamp their settlements, the corporations 
will seek approval from courts that will.270 The problem, from 
Delaware’s point of view, is that the Delaware Chancery Court 
cannot give settling parties the rate of approvals they could 
achieve through forum shopping while still maintaining the ap-
pearance of propriety. Yet that appearance is a crucial compo-
nent of Delaware’s judicial strategy. 
D. ARBITRATION BYLAWS 
The biggest challenge to Delaware’s judicial strategy—arbi-
tration bylaws—is yet to come.271 Arbitration bylaws provide for 
the resolution of internal corporate claims—particularly claims 
by the shareholders against the corporation and its directors and 
officers—through arbitration. Arbitration bylaws will be attrac-
tive to corporate managers because they can sharply reduce both 
the level of shareholder litigation272 and the publicity it receives. 
Reduction in the level of shareholder litigation will result from 
elimination of the principal incentive for bringing cases—fee 
awards by courts to plaintiffs’ attorneys.273 Reduction in the 
level of publicity will result from the secrecy that is pervasive in 
private arbitration. 
Delaware probably cannot prevent its corporations from 
adopting arbitration bylaws. The United States Supreme Court 
 
 270. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 254 (1979) (observing that “competing courts would 
offer not a set of rules designed to optimize dispute resolution but a set designed 
to favor plaintiffs regardless of efficiency”). 
 271. Brian JM Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate 
Law Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 845 (2013) (“[I]t is en-
tirely possible following a policy change at the SEC that Chancery-sponsored 
arbitration could come into widespread use as a method for stemming share-
holder litigation.”). 
 272. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) 
(“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory rem-
edy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”). 
 273. If arbitration bylaws did not provide for the award of attorney’s fees to 
successful plaintiffs, arbitrators would have no basis on which to award them. 
See Beacon Towers Condo. Tr. v. Alex, 42 N.E.3d 1144, 1145 (Mass. 2016). 
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has held that contracts for arbitration are enforceable, and that 
federal policy preempts contrary state laws.274 The Delaware 
courts are irretrievably committed to the view that charters and 
bylaws are contracts between the corporation and its sharehold-
ers,275 leaving Delaware little room to insist that arbitration by-
laws are not arbitration contracts protected by federal law. 
Arbitration bylaws present an existential threat to Dela-
ware. The threat is that public companies will adopt bylaw or 
charter provisions that provide for the arbitration of shareholder 
litigation—leaving the Chancery Court without cases. Once a 
sufficient number of companies have done so, arbitration provid-
ers could replicate every feature of the Delaware court system, 
including specialized judges, speedy dockets, abundant prece-
dent, and even appeals—except fee awards and public access. 
Corporations would no longer have any incentive to litigate in 
public. 
In addition to eliminating fee awards and public access, 
companies and their managers might prefer arbitration to the 
Delaware court system for three other reasons. First, arbitra-
tions could occur in locations convenient to the parties and their 
attorneys—including cyberspace. Because the arbitrations 
would not be in the Delaware courts, the parties would not need 
to be represented by members of the Delaware bar. Second, the 
companies and their managers could write their own procedures 
and tailor them to different kinds of cases. Small cases could be 
heard by a single arbitrator without the possibility of appeal, 
while bet-the-company cases were heard by three arbitrators 
with the possibility of appeal. If shareholders objected to the pro-
cedures, the companies and their managers could negotiate the 
objections. Third, cases filed anywhere other than in the desig-
nated arbitration tribunal could be immediately dismissed, elim-
inating the problem of multidistrict litigation.276  
 
 274. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (“When 
state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the 
analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”). 
 275. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“As our Supreme Court has made clear, the bylaws of a Dela-
ware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the direc-
tors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the 
DGCL.”). 
 276. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in 
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2013) (acknowledging that “for 
any large merger there are likely to be a number of plaintiffs’ attorneys filing 
several competing and fundamentally related claims in multiple jurisdictions”). 
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The widespread adoption of arbitration bylaws by Delaware 
corporations would sharply reduce the amount of shareholder lit-
igation on the Delaware Chancery Court’s docket. That court 
would no longer be privy to new issues as they arose, and the 
production of new precedent would slow. More importantly, be-
cause the Delaware bar would have less involvement in cases 
and less contact with clients, they would be less able to advise 
the Delaware legislature. The companies’ new lawyers would 
have the information flow needed, but they might not have con-
nections to Delaware that would make them loyal to the state. 
The Delaware legislature would be flying blind. It could offer far 
less advantage to companies in return for the premium price Del-
aware extracts for its incorporations. 
Until recently, scholars believed that Delaware dominance 
of American corporate law was secure for the foreseeable fu-
ture.277 That belief was based in large part on their assumption 
that the competitor would be another state, in which case Dela-
ware could simply match its offer.278 But Delaware cannot offer 
the advantages of arbitration. States cannot operate secret tri-
bunals. States cannot require class-action waivers. The Dela-
ware Chancery Court might be able to provide Chancellors at 
locations convenient to the parties, and to conduct hearings and 
trials by teleconferencing. But it would be providing these ser-
vices in direct competition with private companies who did not 
have to meet the requirements of due process—including public 
access. 
Public companies have already begun to adopt arbitration 
bylaws,279 and a few courts have upheld them under Maryland 
 
 277. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 103, at 624 (“Delaware looks to be in 
better shape than ever.”); Klausner, supra note 26, at 847 (asserting that Dela-
ware’s “lead in the charter market is likely to be permanent”). 
 278. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 557 (asserting that “Delaware 
could ‘match’ by adopting the challenger ’s improved rules”); Klausner, supra 
note 26, at 847 (stating that if another state adopted a law with benefits greater 
than Delaware’s it is “difficult to imagine why Delaware would not meet the 
competition and adopt the law as well”). 
 279. Allen, supra note 3, at 780–82 (naming six companies that have adopted 
arbitration bylaws). 
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law.280 Potential issues regarding their adoption remain unset-
tled, but the objections are weak.281 One of those issues—as-
serted by the SEC staff—is that arbitration bylaws are imper-
missible waivers of compliance with the federal securities 
laws.282 The SEC’s objection probably does not apply to the arbi-
tration of state law derivative actions. The SEC’s policy against 
arbitration bylaws in public offerings may already have been re-
versed by the Trump administration.283 
In American Express v. Italian Colors, the Supreme Court 
recently eliminated what might have been the strongest objec-
tion to arbitration bylaws—that they would de facto eliminate 
the remedies of shareholders whose claims were so small that 
they could only be brought as class actions. Instead, the court 
said that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in 
proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination 
of the right to pursue that remedy.”284 
In 2015, Delaware put its defenses against arbitration by-
laws in place. First, section 115 of the DGCL prohibits arbitra-
tion agreements contained only in certificates of incorporation or 
bylaws.285 
 
 280. Del. Cty. Empls. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 WL 
1271528, at *11 (D. Mass. Mar 26, 2014) (stating in dicta that the court would 
uphold an arbitration bylaw adopted before the plaintiff purchased stock with-
out knowledge of it); Katz v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C13-001299, at 1–3 
(Cir. Ct. Balt. Feb. 19, 2014); Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 
24-C-13-001111, at 27 (Cir. Ct. Balt. May 8, 2013). 
 281. Allen, supra note 3, at 770 (referring to the argument that an arbitra-
tion bylaw is substantive under Delaware law as “weak”); id. at 773–74 (dis-
missing the argument that mere purchase of stock is too flimsy a basis on which 
to find a contract for arbitration). 
 282. Id. at 775–82; id. at 777 (arguing that “[t]he Staff ’s position is at odds 
with United States Supreme Court precedent that an agreement to arbitrate is 
not a waiver of substantive rights.”). 
 283. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Piwowar Urges Companies To Pursue Man-
datory Arbitration Clauses, REUTERS (July 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/usa-sec-arbitration/secs-piwowar-urges-companies-to-pursue 
-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-idUSKBN1A221Y (reporting an SEC Commis-
sioner ’s statement encouraging requests by corporations to include mandatory 
arbitration provisions in public offering documents). 
 284. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
 285. See Andrew Holt, Protecting Delaware Corporate Law: Section 115 and 
Its Underlying Ramifications, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 209, 210 (2016) (stating 
that section 115 “does ‘invalidate any provision selecting only non-Delaware 
courts, or any arbitral forum’” (quoting Jack B. Jacobs, New DGCL Amendments 
Endorse Forum Selection Clauses and Prohibit Fee-Shifting, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 17, 2015), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2015/06/17/new-dgcl-amendments-endorse-forum-selection 
-clauses-and-prohibit-fee-shifting)). 
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The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require . . . that any 
or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively 
in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certifi-
cate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims 
in the courts of this State. ‘Internal corporate claims’ means claims, 
including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon 
a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stock-
holder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction 
upon the Court of Chancery.286 
But section 115 is in apparent conflict with section 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The latter provides that written 
agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable and enforcea-
ble.”287 The United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen 
state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type 
of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule.”288 
Second, Delaware adopted the Delaware Rapid Arbitration 
Act (DRAA).289 The DRAA provides a highly expedited arbitra-
tion procedure that Delaware corporations can adopt by signed 
agreement.290 It authorizes the Chancery Court to appoint as ar-
bitrators persons who have been Delaware lawyers for at least 
ten years,291 making DRAA arbitration potentially an arm of the 
Delaware legal community and potentially a replacement for the 
Delaware Chancery Court. If the parties do not specify the loca-
tion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator can decide whether 
to hear it in Delaware or elsewhere.292 But the DRAA’s require-
ment that the arbitration agreement be “signed” is apparently 
intended to exclude arbitration bylaws.293 As currently config-
ured, the DRAA would not apply to most shareholder litigation 
because the shareholders of public companies do not sign the 
companies’ bylaws. 
 
 286. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2018). 
 287. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 288. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011). 
 289. See Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5801–
5812 (2018). 
 290. Id. § 5803. 
 291. Id. § 5805(b)(2). 
 292. Id. § 5807(a). 
 293. H.B. 49, 148th Gen. Assemb. 2015 Sess. (Del. 2015), http:// 
lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/de-rapid-arbitration-act.pdf (Frequently Asked 
Questions appended to bill) (“Specifically, the requirement that the arbitration 
agreement is signed by all parties to the arbitration is meant to exclude the 
possibility that provisions in a certificate of incorporation or by-laws would bind 
stockholders who did not personally sign a document expressly agreeing to ar-
bitration under the Act.”). 
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If the courts invalidate section 115 of the DGCL, Delaware 
could expand the DRAA to include bylaw-imposed arbitration. 
But competing arbitration systems would not impose fee awards 
on defendants, so Delaware could not do so and remain compet-
itive. Without the award of fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the 
change from class and derivative actions to arbitration would 
sharply reduce the magnitude of shareholder dispute resolution, 
perhaps leaving Delaware with too little for its new arbitration-
based strategy to be effective. 
If the arbitration of internal corporate claims replaces liti-
gation, Delaware’s judicial strategy may no longer be viable. The 
next Part speculates on what would happen next. 
III.  THE COMPETITIVE MELTDOWN SCENARIO   
Delaware’s Council294 and most scholars295 conceptualize 
the charter competition as a contest to strike precisely the right 
balance between the statutory rights of managers and share-
holders. In fact, no American corporation statute strikes such a 
balance. Corporation statutes are composed almost entirely of 
default rules.296 The better conceptualization is that state corpo-
ration statutes allow managers and shareholders to strike pre-
cisely the right balance by contract. The balance struck heavily 
favors managers because, as the entity’s initiators, they initially 
possess all the power and can cede to shareholders only as much 
as they consider necessary to attract investment. 
 
 294. See COUNCIL EXPLANATION, supra note 27, at 11 (referring to “the care-
ful balance that the State has strived to maintain between the interests of di-
rectors, officers, and controlling stockholders, and the interests of other stock-
holders”). 
 295. Fisch, supra note 193, at 1676 (reporting University of Delaware Pro-
fessor Charles Elson’s comment that “the Delaware legislature sought to main-
tain a corporate law that balanced the interests of shareholders and managers”); 
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 739–40 (“Because both managers and share-
holders influence incorporation decisions, Delaware can benefit from designing 
its product to be attractive, if not equally so, to both shareholders and managers 
of as many corporations as possible.”); Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: 
From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Se-
curities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 537 (2005) (“[F]irm managers are con-
strained by market forces to seek out corporate law that is best for investors.”); 
Winter, supra note 60, at 256 (“States seeking corporate charters will thus try 
to provide legal systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relation-
ship.”). 
 296. But see Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Cor-
porate Law, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 383, 384 (2007) (asserting the dominant view is 
that “most corporate law rules” are default rules). 
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But if one considers not merely the statutes but the entire 
corporation-law packages of the states, Delaware is arguably an 
exception. Delaware’s judicial strategy uses purportedly manda-
tory rules regarding fiduciary duty to regulate in a variety of ar-
eas. That use is disingenuous, serving Delaware’s interests and 
public decorum by appearing to regulate more than it does. Nev-
ertheless, Delaware’s courts do, to some degree, balance the 
rights of managers and shareholders. 
Competing states have been unable to match Delaware’s 
charade because they lack chancery courts. But so long as Dela-
ware can plausibly maintain that it enforces high fiduciary 
standards, the other states cannot abandon the pretense that 
they also enforce such standards. Abandoning that pretense of 
enforcement would risk the respectability of their charters and 
perhaps detract from the respectability of the states them-
selves.297 
If Delaware’s judicial strategy were to fail and the cases mi-
grate to secret arbitration, the states’ need to maintain a regu-
latory facade would disappear. Delaware could no longer have 
one standard on the books and enforce a different one in its 
courts. Given a choice between a statute with fiduciary con-
straints that would be enforced by neutral arbitrators and a stat-
ute with no constraints at all, managers would choose the latter. 
Delaware would have to make the same choice. 
To abandon the cloak of pseudo-regulation, a state’s corpo-
ration law might provide that “the certificate of incorporation 
and the bylaws shall govern the relations among the sharehold-
ers, the directors, the officers, and the corporation. To the extent 
the certificate of incorporation and the bylaws do not provide for 
a matter, this Act governs.”298 To go a step further, the law of a 
state seeking to compete with Delaware might provide that “to 
the extent that the Delaware General Corporation Law grants 
any right, privilege or ability to Delaware corporations, corpora-
tions of this state shall have the same rights, privileges and abil-
ities.” The corporation and its shareholders could agree to abol-
ish shareholder litigation,299 to litigate in the courts of the most 
 
 297. Nevada apparently decided to take the risk, by largely eliminating di-
rector ’s fiduciary duties. Barzuza, supra note 111, at 936 (“In offering lax cor-
porate law, Nevada capitalizes on its reputation as a lax regulator.”). 
 298. I took this language from the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 105 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2013), changing only the entity type. 
 299. Abolition might or might not be effective, but effectiveness would not 
depend on the contents of the state’s corporation law. 
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convenient state or states (which might include Delaware),300 or 
to submit their disputes to arbitration.301 By enacting such pro-
visions, a state would immediately achieve contractarian effi-
ciency with respect to its corporate law. 
Of course, establishing the relationship between the corpo-
ration and the state would still require some mandatory rules. 
They include the rules authorizing the Secretary of State to 
maintain records and make them available, the rules requiring 
corporations to furnish information and pay fees and taxes, and 
the rules specifying the penalties for failure to comply. But the 
relationships among the corporation and its officers, directors, 
and shareholders—including their preferred manner of dispute 
resolution—would be established by contract. 
From the perspective of domestic corporations, a state’s 
adoption of this contractarian strategy would be hardly noticea-
ble. Existing corporations could keep the certificates of incorpo-
ration and bylaws they already have. Except for the addition of 
the two or three sentences set forth above,302 the state’s corpora-
tion statute could remain the same. The effect of the changes 
would be merely that any mandatory rules that governed the re-
lationship among the corporation and its officers, directors, and 
shareholders would have become default rules. Few mandatory 
rules exist in American corporation laws anyway. 
Adoption of the contractarian strategy would fundamentally 
change the corporate charter competition. The states currently 
purport to compete in large part on the basis of their corporate-
law expertise, as reflected in the supposed quality of their corpo-
rate laws and judicial decisions. To compete by the contractarian 
strategy, a state needs no corporate-law expertise. The corpora-
tions, institutional shareholders, and shareholder advisory ser-
vices would supply the expertise. Because it would, for the first 
 
 300. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides:  
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him or her 
in his or her reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, 
shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered 
according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without 
sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2018) provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery 
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity.” 
Any chartering state could provide that by incorporating in the chartering state, 
the corporation and its officers and directors submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery. 
 301. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 751 (discussing the availability of arbi-
tration). 
 302. See supra text accompanying note 298 and the following sentence. 
 2164 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2101 
 
time, be clear which rules of corporate law were mandatory and 
which were default, a corporation incorporated in a contractar-
ian state could elect to have the default rules of any state or pri-
vate body apply. The debate over what rules were best would 
continue, but the states would no longer participate.303 
In competing against the contractarian strategy, Delaware 
would gain little advantage from lawyers’ knowledge of Dela-
ware law or Delaware’s body of judicial precedent. Corporations 
formed in other states could adopt the portions of Delaware law 
they wanted and sweep away the rest merely by drafting charter 
or bylaw provisions that said so.  
A state’s adoption of the contractarian strategy would not 
solve all of its competitive problems. The state would still have 
to maintain an agency that sold charters, collected fees, taxes, 
and information, and made the corporate information available 
to law enforcement, paying customers, and the general public. 
The state would have to be competitive in that realm. But, like 
enacting a corporation law composed of only default rules, oper-
ating a corporate-records website requires no corporate-law ex-
pertise. 
Explicit adoption of the contractarian strategy by a single 
state would provide that state with an advantage in charter com-
petition against Delaware, Nevada, and other states whose stat-
utes continued to contain mandatory rules. Perhaps more im-
portantly, it would provide the state with an advantage in 
competing for business activity by demonstrating once and for 
all the state’s business friendliness. I consider it reasonably clear 
that if a state adopted the contractarian strategy, it would at-
tract both national attention and public-company incorpora-
tions. 
To predict the effect of a state’s adoption of the contractarian 
strategy on the charter competition system is more difficult. The 
first step is to predict the optimal strategic responses of the other 
states. To do that by the systems-strategic method requires a re-
iterative process—predict tentative initial responses, project 
where they lead, and then consider whether knowing the results 
would change the initial responses. 
To illustrate, assume that after the first state’s adoption of 
the contractarian strategy, other states followed. Because the 
corporate laws of those states would be identical—imposing no 
 
 303. Translated to game theory, the corporate charter competition would 
then be a prisoner ’s dilemma problem. 
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regulation at all—competition among them would be confined to 
(1) price, that is, taxes and fees for incorporation in the state; 
and (2) the quality of the states’ corporate administrators. Dela-
ware might amend its laws to prevent foreign corporations from 
using the Delaware courts, and rely on the quality of its courts, 
combined with an assumed illegality of arbitration, to retain its 
corporations. But if those defenses failed, the competition might 
melt down to a new level of triviality. To corporations, the states 
would no longer be providers of corporate law. Corporate law 
would be the contents of the articles or certificates of incorpora-
tion.304 The states would be mere websites in price competition 
to register and verify the corporations’ existences. 
To the states, corporations would no longer be providers of 
filing fees and tax revenues. Prices would decline to approach 
the costs of operating the states’ websites. The least efficient 
states might even continue to compete at a loss in order to save 
face. If this projection is correct, no state would benefit from the 
contractarian strategy in the long run. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that no state should pursue it. 
Until events unfolded, the states could not be sure the pro-
jection was correct. Delaware’s courts might prove to be a dura-
ble advantage, preventing a complete meltdown. Other states 
may or may not be able to free-ride on Delaware’s courts or to 
offer arbitration as an alternative. In the midst of this uncer-
tainty, it makes more sense for a state that wants to compete for 
charters to be the first mover rather than hope that all states 
will refrain. Even if a state’s adoption of a contractarian corpo-
rate statute merely provoked a federal takeover of corporate 
chartering, the state provoking it would have proven itself the 
most business friendly. Thus I conclude that it makes sense for 
a state to adopt a contractarian corporation law now. 
  CONCLUSION   
The principal functions of the corporate charter competition 
are to deregulate corporate law and to insulate the deregulation 
from political reversal. The system deregulates by allowing the 
managers of each corporation to choose the state that regulates 
 
 304. This transformation has already occurred with respect to fiduciary du-
ties in Delaware LLCs and limited partnerships. Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge En-
ergy Co., 159 A.3d 242, 245 (Del. 2017) (“Another benefit under Delaware law 
is the ability to eliminate common law duties in favor of contractual ones, 
thereby restricting disputes to the four corners of the limited partnership agree-
ment (‘LPA’).”). 
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the corporation and—through the mechanism of the internal af-
fairs doctrine—requiring all other states to acquiesce. 
State benefits from competition are sufficiently large that 
several states compete actively. Even the noncompeting states 
conform their corporate laws to the corporate laws of the com-
peting states. Earlier scholarship had assumed that, if states 
competed at all, they did so to gain filing fee and tax revenues. 
The states’ primary motive—to attract business activity—went 
unnoticed. Except in Delaware, incorporations are not them-
selves significant business activity. But competing for incorpora-
tions is a means by which the states demonstrate their business-
friendliness and thereby attract other business activity. 
More than a century of charter competition has produced 
corporate law devoid of meaningful regulation. If a state imposed 
meaningful regulation on managers, managers would reincorpo-
rate to a state that did not. 
Charter competition purports to be a system that generates 
law reflecting the combined preferences of corporate stakehold-
ers and the state and federal governments. But in reality, char-
ter competition reflects only the managers’ preferences to be free 
from meaningful regulation. That is, regardless of other stake-
holders’ preferences, charter competition would produce the 
same product. The system’s design assures that at least one state 
will always be willing to modify its corporation laws to appeal to 
managers, that managers will be able reincorporate if necessary 
to avoid regulation, and that corporations will remain unregu-
lated. Deregulation is the only result the competition’s design 
can produce.  
Charter competition is effectively beyond democratic con-
trol. That is, no path exists by which citizens or their represent-
atives could impose meaningful regulation on corporations with-
out first making other difficult or impossible changes. Charter 
competition is therefore a system in which corporations, not cit-
izens or their representatives, hold the power to regulate. 
Delaware dominates the charter competition by leveraging 
its unique Chancery Court. Unlike the courts of other states, the 
Chancery Court is significantly specialized in corporate law, 
publishes its opinions, has a large body of precedent, tries cases 
without juries, and has the resources and motivation to provide 
quick hearings. In reliance on its judicial advantage, Delaware 
enacted a vague, complex, and incomplete corporation law. 
Those qualities have made it possible for Delaware judges to re-
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solve cases based largely on the interests of managers and Dela-
ware. The litigation provided work for Delaware lawyers and en-
abled them to develop corporate expertise. Because they had 
that expertise, the state gave its lawyers control over the legis-
lative process with respect to corporate law. 
Delaware’s highly successful judicial strategy now appears 
to be unraveling. Beginning in 2001, Delaware Chancery Court 
cuts to the fees of plaintiffs’ attorneys began making it difficult 
for that Court to attract cases. In 2010, the Court changed strat-
egies by encouraging corporations to adopt bylaws that required 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to sue in Delaware. Delaware corporations 
adopted those “forum selection” bylaws. But the corporations 
have been reluctant to invoke them when the Delaware courts 
seemed less likely than other courts to approve their questiona-
ble settlements. If the Delaware courts do not approve question-
able settlements, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the Delaware cor-
porations will take the cases to other courts that will. If the 
Delaware courts do approve questionable settlements, Dela-
ware’s reputation and the charter competition’s legitimacy may 
be impaired. Either way, Delaware is in trouble. 
Arbitration bylaws may be Delaware’s coup de grace. Corpo-
rations have already begun adopting them and United States 
Supreme Court opinions prevent the states from banning their 
use. Delaware cannot compete with private arbitration compa-
nies by converting its judges into arbitrators. Corporations want 
secret arbitration, but the Constitution prohibits Delaware 
judges from providing secrecy.  
Nor would the expansion of Delaware’s Rapid Arbitration 
Act to unsigned arbitration provisions in certificates and bylaws 
solve Delaware’s problem. Arbitration bylaws will not merely 
move the same cases to a different forum. Arbitration bylaws can 
and will bar plaintiffs from proceeding in representative capaci-
ties and bar arbitrators from providing fee awards to successful 
plaintiffs. Because most plaintiffs who bring shareholder litiga-
tion do not individually have enough money at stake to warrant 
even the cost of arbitration, the system’s shift to arbitration will 
sharply reduce the number of cases brought.  
Without enough cases, Delaware’s judicial strategy would 
fail, leaving that state with little advantage over competing 
states. Competing states may seize the opportunity by adopting 
statutes that allow certificate of incorporation and bylaw provi-
sions to displace the provisions of their corporation laws to the 
full extent of the internal affairs doctrine. Because states need 
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no corporate law expertise to enact such a statute and their 
courts need no corporate law expertise to enforce arbitration 
awards, Delaware’s history, familiarity, networks, and prece-
dent would count for little. Corporate charter competition might 
turn solely on price and the quality of the states’ websites. No 
state could gain significant revenues in so competitive an envi-
ronment. But charter competition would still provide a forum in 
which the states could demonstrate their business friendliness, 
and by doing so attract significant business activity. 
Thus, even without Delaware and without charter competi-
tion revenues for Delaware’s successors, corporate charter com-
petition would continue. The structure of the competition is its 
root cause, and that structure remains stable: corporations can 
incorporate anywhere. Once incorporated, corporations can do 
business anywhere. The law of the incorporation state governs 
their internal affairs. Until at least one of those three fundamen-
tal and long-standing principles is abandoned, corporate charter 
competition will prevent meaningful regulation of corporations. 
